

ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 357. BAND

JOHN F. HALDON

RECRUITMENT AND CONSCRIPTION
IN THE BYZANTINE ARMY C. 550—950

A STUDY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE
STRATIOTIKA KTEMATA



VERLAG
DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
WIEN 1979

Vorgelegt von w. M. HERBERT HUNGER in der Sitzung am 27. April 1979

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

— ISBN 3 7001 0314 X

Copyright © 1979 by

Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften
Wien

Druck R. Spies & Co., 1050 Wien

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT TITLES	7
INTRODUCTION	17
A. THE SIXTH AND EARLY SEVENTH CENTURY AND THE "HERACLEIAN REFORM"	20
B. THE "MILITARY LANDS" ACCORDING TO THE NINTH- AND TENTH- CENTURY EVIDENCE	41
C. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE "MILITARY LANDS"	66
GENERAL INDEX	83

FOREWORD

The present study was intended originally to be a much shorter examination of the evidence concerning the "stratiōtai" and the landed properties upon which their service in the Byzantine provincial armies was ostensibly based during the ninth and tenth century. As the work progressed, however, it became apparent that this could only be satisfactorily analysed against the background of developments in recruitment in general for the army from the seventh century on. Since its length precluded publication in one of the usual journals devoted to Byzantine studies, I am very pleased to be able to express my gratitude to Professor HERBERT HUNGER of the Institute for Byzantine Studies in Vienna, whose interest and personal intervention enabled the presentation of the study for publication in the "Sitzungsberichte" of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. I should like here to thank both Professor HUNGER for his support and the Austrian Academy for their readiness to publish the paper.

Thanks are also due to Professor WALTER KAEGLI, JR., for his perceptive criticisms and many helpful suggestions; and last, but not least, to Dr. OTTO KRESTEN of the Institute for Byzantine Studies, Vienna, both for his critical assessment of the argument and for willingly undertaking the editorial burdens which accompany such a publication.

The study represents one of several projects undertaken during tenure of a DAAD fellowship and an Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Fellowship at the Institut für Byzantinistik in Munich, 1976—1979. I should like to thank both foundations for their generous support.

Munich, February 1979.

JOHN F. HALDON

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT TITLES

<i>AASS</i>	<i>Acta Sanctorum</i> . Antwerp 1643ff.
<i>AnBoll</i>	<i>Analecta Bollandiana</i> . Bruxelles 1882ff.
Acta M. Anastasii Persae	Acta M. Anastasii Persae, ed. H. USENER. Bonn 1894.
<i>AHASH</i>	<i>Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i> . Budapest 1952ff.
Anon. VARI	Incerti Scriptoris Byzantini saec. X. Liber De Re Militari, ed. R. VARI. Leipzig 1901.
ANTONIADIS-BIBICOU, Histoire Maritime	H. ANTONIADIS-BIBICOU, Études d'histoire maritime de Byzance. A propos du "thème des Caraviens" (<i>Bibliothèque Générale de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études</i> , VI ^e Section). Paris 1966.
AHRWEILER, Administration	H. GLYKATZI-AHRWEILER, Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantin aux IX—XI ^e siècles. <i>BCH</i> 84 (1960) 1—109.
AUSSARESSES	F. AUSSARESSES, L'Armée byzantine à la fin du VI ^e siècle d'après le Stratégicon de l'empereur Maurice (<i>Bibliothèque des Universités du Midi</i> 14). Paris 1909.
Bas. A	Basilicorum libri LX, ser. A, edd. H. J. SCHELTEMA et N. VAN DER WAL. Groningen 1955ff.
Bas. B	Basilicorum libri LX, ser. B: Scholia, edd. H. J. SCHELTEMA — D. HOLWERDA. Groningen 1953ff.
<i>BBA</i>	<i>Berliner Byzantinistische Arbeiten</i> . Berlin 1955ff.
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i> . Paris 1877ff.
BERTOLINI, Strutture sociali	O. BERTOLINI, Ordinamenti militari e strutture sociali dei Longobardi in Italia, in: Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell'alto Medioevo (<i>Settimane di Studi del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto Medioevo</i> XV/1; 1967). Spoleto 1968, 429—607.
BEŠEVLEV, Inschriften	V. BEŠEVLEV, Spätgriechische und spätlateinische Inschriften aus Bulgarien (<i>BBA</i> 30). Berlin 1964.
<i>BGA</i>	<i>Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum</i> , ed. M.-J. DE GOEJE. Leiden 1870 ff. (nunc continuata consultantibus R. BLACHÈRE [etc.]. Leiden 1938ff.).
<i>BK</i>	<i>Bedi Karthlisa</i> . Paris 1942ff.
<i>BMGS</i>	<i>Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies</i> . London 1975ff.
<i>BNJ</i>	<i>Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher</i> . Berlin (Athens) 1920ff.

- BROWN, Italy T. S. BROWN, *Social Structure and the Hierarchy of Officialdom in Byzantine Italy, 554—800 A.D.* Unpubl. Ph. D. Thesis, University of Nottingham 1976.
- BSI *Byzantinoslavica*. Prague 1929ff.
- BUHJ *Birmingham University Historical Journal*. Birmingham 1958ff.
- Byz *Byzantion*. Bruxelles (Paris) 1924ff.
- Byzanz im 7. Jhdt. Byzanz im 7. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zur Herausbildung des Feudalismus, von F. WINKELMANN, H. KÖPSTEIN, H. DITTEN, I. ROCHOW (*BBA* 48). Berlin 1978.
- BZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. (Leipzig) München 1892ff.
- CCM *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*. Poitiers 1957ff.
- CFHB *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae*. Washington 1967ff. (Series Washingtonensis); Berlin(-New York) 1967ff. (Series Berolinensis); Wien 1975ff. (Series Vindobonensis); Roma 1975ff. (Series Italica); Bruxelles 1975ff. (Series Bruxellensis).
- Chronicon Paschale Chronicon Paschale, ed. L. DINDORF (*CSHB*). Bonn 1832.
- CI Codex Iustinianus, ed. P. KRÜGER (*CIC* II). Berlin 1963.
- CIC Corpus Iuris Civilis, edd. TH. MOMMSEN — P. KRÜGER — R. SCHOELL — W. KROLL, 3 vols. Berlin 1892—1895 (Repr. 1945—1963).
- CSHB *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, 50 vols. Bonn 1828—1897.
- CTh Codex Theodosianus, edd. TH. MOMMSEN, P. MEYER et al. Berlin 1905.
- DAI Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*. Greek text ed. GY. MORAVCSIK. English translation by R. J. H. JENKINS. New revised edition (*CFHB* I) (*Dumbarton Oaks Texts* I). Washington 1967; II, *Commentary*, ed. R. J. H. JENKINS. London 1962.
- DARROUZÈS, Épistoliers J. DARROUZÈS, *Épistoliers byzantins du X^e siècle* (*Archives de l'orient Chrétien* 6). Paris 1960.
- De Caer. Constantini Porphyrogeniti imperatoris *De Cerimoniis aulae byzantinae libri duo*, ed. J. REISKE (*CSHB*). Bonn 1829.
- De S. Maria Iuniore De S. Maria Iuniore, in: *AASS* Novembris IV 692—705.

- De Vel. Bell. De Velitatione Bellica Domini Nicephori Augusti, in: Leonis Diaconi Caloensis Historiae Libri Decem, ed. C. B. HASE (*CSHB*). Bonn 1828, 179—258.
- DIEHL, L'Exarchat CH. DIEHL, Études sur l'administration byzantine dans l'Exarchat de Ravenne (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* 53). Paris 1888.
- Digesta Digesta, ed. TH. MOMMSEN, retractavit P. KRÜGER (*CIC I*). Berlin ¹⁶1954.
- DÖLGER, Ableitung F. DÖLGER, Zur Ableitung des byzantinischen Verwaltungsterminus *ῥέμα*, in: Festschrift W. ENSSLIN (= *Historia* 4 [1955]) 189—198. Repr. in: F. DÖLGER, *Paraspora*. Ettal 1961, 231—240.
- DÖLGER, Beiträge F. DÖLGER, Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung besonders des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts (*Byzantisches Archiv* 9). Leipzig 1927 (Repr. Hildesheim 1960).
- DÖLGER, Regesten F. DÖLGER, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des ost-römischen Reiches von 565—1453 (*Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit*, Reihe A, Abt. I), 5 vols. München-Berlin 1924—1965.
- DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*. (Cambridge/Mass.) Washington 1941ff.
- DU CANGE, Gloss. Glossarium ad Scriptores mediae et infimae Graecitatis, ed. CAROLUS DU FRESNE DOMINUS DU CANGE. Leyden 1688.
- Ecloga Ecloga legum Leonis et Constantini, in: *JGR* II 1—62.
- EEBΣ 'Επετηρίς 'Εταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν. Athens 1924 ff.
- EHR *English Historical Review*. London 1885 ff.
- Evagrius, HE The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius, edd. J. BIDEZ — L. PARMENTIER. London 1898 (Repr. Amsterdam 1964).
- Exc. de Insid. Excerpta historica iussu imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta III. Excerpta de Insidiis, ed. C. DE BOOR. Berlin 1905.
- Exc. de Leg. Excerpta historica iussu imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta I. Excerpta de Legationibus, 2 parts, ed. C. DE BOOR. Berlin 1903.
- Exc. de Sent. Excerpta historica iussu imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta IV. Excerpta de Sententiis, ed. U. PH. BOISSEVAIN. Berlin 1906.

- Exp. Persica Georgii Pisidae Expositio Persica, ed. A. PERTUSI, in: Giorgio di Pisidia, Poemi I: Panegirici Epici. Ettal 1959 (Text: 84—136; Commentary: 136 to 162).
- FHG *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, edd. C. and Th. Müller, 5 vols. Paris 1874—1885.
- FM *Fontes Minores* I, ed. D. SIMON (*Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte* I). Frankfurt 1976.
- GIGLI, Reclutamento G. GIGLI, Formi di reclutamento militare durante il Basso Impero. *Atti del Acad. Naz. dei Lincei (Rendiconti Cl. Sc., mor., stor. e filol.)* 8/2 (1974) 268—289.
- Greg., Register Gregorii I papae registrum epistolarum I/1, ed. P. EWALD; I/2; II, ed. L. M. HARTMANN (*MGH, Epistolae* I—II). Berlin 1891. 1899.
- GRIERSON, DOC II PH. GRIERSON, Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittemore Collection II: Phocas to Theodosius III, 602—717. Washington D. C. 1968.
- GROSSE, Militärgeschichte R. GROSSE, Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der byzantinischen Themenverfassung. Berlin 1920.
- GUILLOU, Régionalisme A. GUILLOU, Régionalisme et indépendance dans l'empire byzantin au VII^e siècle: L'exemple de l'Exarchat et de la Pentapole d'Italie. Rome 1969.
- HALDON, Military Technology J. F. HALDON, Some Aspects of Byzantine Military Technology from the Sixth to the Tenth Centuries. *BMGS* 1 (1975) 11—47.
- HALDON, Some Remarks J. F. HALDON, Some Remarks on the Background to the Iconoclast Controversy. *BSI* 38 (1977) 161—184.
- HC *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*. Athens 1947 ff.
- Hell Ἑλληνικά. Athens (Thessaloniki) 1928 ff.
- HGM *Historici Graeci Minores*, ed. L. DINDORF, 2 vols. Leipzig 1870—1871.
- HUNGER, Profane Literatur H. HUNGER, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner (*Byzantinisches Handbuch im Rahmen des Handbuchs der Altertumswissenschaft* V/1—2 = XII/5, 1—2). München 1978.
- Ioannes Antiochenus Ioannis Antiocheni Fragmenta, in: *FHG* V 27—38; Exc. de Insid. 58—150.
- Ioannes Biclár. Ioannis abbatis monasterii Biclarenensis Chronica, in: *MGH(AA)* XI/2 211—220.

- Ioannes Epiph. Ioannis Epiphaniensis Fragmenta, in: *FHG* IV 272—276.
- JGR* *Ius Graeco-Romanum*, edd. I. and P. ZEPOS, 8 vols. Athens 1931 (Repr. Aalen 1962).
- JHS* *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. London 1880ff.
- JÖB* *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, vol. 18ff. Wien(-Köln-Graz) 1969ff.
- JÖBG* *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft*, vols. 1—17. Wien(-Köln-Graz) 1951 to 1968.
- John of Ephesus The Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History of John of Ephesus, ed. and trans. R. PAYNE-SMITH. Oxford 1860.
- JONES, LRE A. H. M. JONES, *The Later Roman Empire*, 284 to 602: A social, economic and administrative survey, 3 vols. and maps. Oxford 1964.
- Just., Nov. Justiniani novellae constitutiones, edd. R. SCHOELL et W. KROLL (CIC III). Berlin ⁶1954.
- KAEGI, New Evidence W. E. KAEGI, JR., New Evidence on the Early Reign of Heraclius. *BZ* 66 (1973) 308—330.
- KARAYANNOPOULOS, Contribution J. KARAYANNOPOULOS, Contribution au problème des thèmes byzantins. *HC* 10 (1956) 455—502.
- KARAYANNOPOULOS, Entstehung J. KARAYANNOPOULOS, Die Entstehung der byzantinischen Themenordnung (*Byzantisches Archiv* 10). München 1959.
- KARAYANNOPOULOS, Vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit J. KARAYANNOPOULOS, Die vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit des Kaisers Herakleios. *JÖBG* 10 (1961) 53—57.
- KASER, RPR II M. KASER, Das römische Privatrecht. 2. Abschnitt: Die nachklassischen Entwicklungen (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft* X/3, 3, 2). München ²1975.
- Kekaumenos Cecaumeni Strategicon et incerti scriptoris de officiis regis libellus, edd. B. WASSILIEWSKY et V. JERNSTEDT. St. Petersburg 1896 (Repr. Amsterdam 1965).
- (WASSILIEWSKY — JERNSTEDT)
- Kekaumenos Sovieti i rasskazi Kekavmena: Sočinenie vizantiiskogo polkovodtsa XI veka. Text, trans. and commentary G. G. LITAVRIN. Moscow 1972.
- (LITAVRIN)
- KUČMA, V. V. KUČMA, Komandniyi sostav i ryadovye stratioty v femnon vojske Vizantii v konče IX—X v., in: *Vizantiiskie Očerki*. Moscow 1971, 86—97.
- Komandniyi sostav
- Leg. Mil. (ASHBURNER) *Leges militares*: ed. A. ASHBURNER, *The Byzantine Mutiny Act*. *JHS* 46 (1926) 80—109. Repr. in: *JGR* II 93—103.

- Leg. Mil. (KORŽENSKY) Leges militares: ed. E. KORŽENSKY, Leges Poenales Militares. *Egyptemes Philologiae Közlöny* (1930) 155—163, 215—218. Repr. in: *JGR* II 80—89.
- LEMERLE, Esquisse P. LEMERLE, Esquisse pour un histoire agraire de Byzance. Part I. *RH* 219 (1958) 32—74. 254—284. Part II. *RH* 220 (1958) 42—94.
- Leo, Tact. Leonis Imperatoris *Tactica*, in: *PG* 107, cols. 672—1120; ed. R. VARI, Leonis Imperatoris *Tactica* I (proem., const. I—XI). II (const. XII—XIII, XIV/1—38) (*Sylloge Tacticorum Graecorum* III). Budapest 1917—1922.
- LILIE, Die byzantinische Reaktion R.-J. LILIE, Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber (*Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia* 22). München 1976.
- LILIE, „Thrakien“ und „Thrakesion“ R.-J. LILIE, „Thrakien“ und „Thrakesion“. *JÖB* 26 (1977) 7—47.
- LIPŠIC, Ekloga E. E. LIPŠIC, Ekloga. *Vizantiiskii Zakonodatel'nii svod VIII veka*. Moscow 1965.
- Lydus Ioannis Lydi De Magistratibus Populi Romani, ed. I. BEKKER (*CSHB*). Bonn 1837; Ioannis Lydi De Magistratibus Populi Romani Libri Tres, ed. R. WÜNSCH. Leipzig 1903.
- MASPÉRO, Organisation J. MASPÉRO, Organisation militaire de l'Égypte byzantin. Paris 1912.
- Maurice, Strategikon Mauricius Arta Militară, ed. H. MIHĂESCU. București 1970.
- Menander Protector Menandri Protectoris Fragmenta, in: *HGM* II 1—131; Exc. de Leg. I 170—221. II 442—477.
- MGH (AA) *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* (*Auctores Antiquissimi*), edd. G. PERTZ, TH. MOMMSEN et al. Berlin 1877—1919.
- MIQUEL, Géographie A. MIQUEL, La géographie humaine du monde musulmane jusqu'au milieu du XI^e siècle. I: Géographie et géographie humaine dans la littérature arabe des origines à 1050. Paris 1967. II: Géographie arabe et représentation du monde: La terre et l'étranger. Paris 1975.
- Miracula S. Georgii Miracula S. Georgii, ed. J. B. AUFHAUSER. Leipzig 1913.
- Miracula S. Therapontis Miracula S. Therapontis, in: *AASS* Maii VI 682 to 692.
- MOMMSEN, Militärwesen TH. MOMMSEN, Das römische Militärwesen seit Diocletian. *Hermes* 24 (1889) 195—279.
- MÜLLER, Heer A. MÜLLER, Das Heer Justinians nach Prokop und Agathias. *Philologus* 71 (1912) 101—138.

- NE* *Néos 'Ελληνομνήμων*, vols. 1—21 and index. Athens 1904—1930.
- Nicephorus Nicephori archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani Opuscula historica, ed. C. DE BOOR. Leipzig 1880.
- Nicholas I, Letters Nicholas I, Patriarch of Constantinople, Letters. Text and trans. R. J. H. JENKINS — L. G. WESTERINK (*CFHB* VI) (*Dumbarton Oaks Texts* II). Washington D. C. 1973.
- Notitia Dig. Notitia Dignitatum utriusque imperii, ed. O. SEECK. Leipzig 1876.
- OIKONOMIDÈS, Les premiers mentions N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Les premiers mentions des thèmes dans le chronique de Theophane. *ZRVI* 16 (1975) 1—8.
- OIKONOMIDÈS, Préséance N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Les listes de préséance byzantines des IX^e et X^e siècles. Introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire. Paris 1972.
- OSTROGORSKY, Geschichte G. OSTROGORSKY, Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates (*Byzantisches Handbuch im Rahmen des Handbuchs der Altertumswissenschaft* I/2 = XII/1, 2). München 1963.
- OSTROGORSKY, History G. OSTROGORSKY, A History of the Byzantine State. Engl. transl. J. M. HUSSEY. Oxford 1968.
- OSTROGORSKY, La Date G. OSTROGORSKY, Sur la date de la composition du livre des thèmes et sur l'époque de la constitution des premiers thèmes d'Asie Mineure. *Byz* 23 (1953) 31—66.
- OSTROGORSKY, L'Exarchat G. OSTROGORSKY, L'Exarchat de Ravenne et l'origine des thèmes byzantins. *Corsi di Cultura sull'Arte Ravennate e Bizantina* VII/1 (1960) 99 to 110.
- PATLAGEAN, L'Impôt payé par les soldats E. PATLAGEAN, L'Impôt payé par les soldats au VI^e siècle, in: Armées et fiscalités dans le monde antique (*Colloques Nationaux du CNRS* 936). Paris 1977, 303—309.
- PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté E. PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance. Paris 1977.
- PERTUSI, La Formation A. PERTUSI, La Formation des thèmes byzantins, in: Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongreß, part I. München 1958, 1—40.
- PERTUSI, Ordinamenti A. PERTUSI, Ordinamenti militari, guerre in Occidente e teoria di guerra dei Bizantini (secc. VI—X), in: Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell'alto Medioevo (*Settimane di Studi del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto Medioevo* XV/2; 1967). Spoleto 1968, 631—700.

- PG* J.-P. MIGNÉ, *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca*, 161 vols. Paris 1857—1866.
- PP* *Past and Present*. London 1952ff.
- Proc., BG Procopii Caesariensis De Bello Gothico (De Bellis libri V—VIII) in: Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia II, ed. J. HAURY. Leipzig 1905. Editio ster. corr. G. WIRTH. Leipzig 1963.
- Proc., BP Procopii Caesariensis De Bello Persico (De Bellis libri I—II) in: Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia I, ed. J. HAURY. Leipzig 1905. Editio ster. corr. G. WIRTH. Leipzig 1963.
- Proc., BV Procopii Caesariensis De Bello Vandalico (De Bellis libri III—IV) in: Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia I, ed. J. HAURY. Leipzig 1905. Editio ster. corr. G. WIRTH. Leipzig 1963.
- Proc., HA Procopii Caesariensis Historia Arcana, in: Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia III, ed. J. HAURY. Leipzig 1906. Editio ster. corr. G. WIRTH. Leipzig 1963.
- Proch. Nom. Imperatorum Basilii, Constantini et Leonis Prochiron, in: *JGR* II 108—228.
- Psellus, Scripta Minora Michaelis Pselli Scripta Minora, edd. G. KURTZ et F. DREXL, 2 vols. Milan 1936—1941.
- REA* *Revue des Études Arméniennes*. N. ser. Paris 1964ff.
- REB* *Revue des Études Byzantines* (1—3: *Études Byzantines*). (Bucharest) Paris 1944ff.
- RESEE* *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*. Bucharest 1963ff.
- RH* *Revue Historique*. Paris 1876ff.
- RL* *Revue de Linguistique*. Bucharest 1956ff.
- ROC* *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*. Ser. 1, vols. 1—10. Paris 1896—1905. Ser. 2, vols. 1—10. Paris 1906 to 1915/17. Ser. 3, vols. 1—10. Paris 1918/19—1935/36 (vols. 1—30).
- Sebeos Sébéos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, trad. F. MACLER. Paris 1904.
- SEG* *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, edd. J. J. E. HONDIUS — A. G. WOODHEAD. Leyden 1923ff.
- STEIN, Studien E. STEIN, *Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Reiches vornehmlich unter den Kaisern Justinus II. und Tiberius Konstantinus*. Stuttgart 1919.
- STRATOS, Τὸ Βυζάντιον στὸν Ζ' αἰῶνα A. M. STRATOS, *Τὸ Βυζάντιον στὸν Ζ' αἰῶνα*, 6 vols. Athens 1965—1977.

- Studien zum 7. Jhdt. Studien zum 7. Jahrhundert in Byzanz. Probleme der Herausbildung des Feudalismus, ed. by H. KÖPSTEIN — F. WINKELMANN (*BBA* 47). Berlin 1976.
- TEALL, Barbarians J. L. TEALL, The Barbarians in Justinian's Armies. *Speculum* 40 (1965) 294—322.
- TEALL, Grain Supply J. L. TEALL, The Grain Supply of the Byzantine Empire. *DOP* 13 (1959) 87—139.
- Theophanes Theophanis Chronographia, ed. C. DE BOOR, 2 vols. Leipzig 1883—1885.
- Theophanes cont. Theophanes continuatus, Ioannes Caminiata, Symeon Magister, Georgius Monachus continuatus, ed. I. BEKKER (*CSHB*). Bonn 1825, 1—481.
- Theophyl. Simocatta Theophylacti Simocattae Historiae, ed. C. DE BOOR. Leipzig 1887. Editio corr. P. WIRTH. Stuttgart 1972.
- TM *Travaux et Mémoires*. Paris 1965 ff.
- V. Eustratii Vita Eustratii, ed. A. PAPADOPOULOS-KERAMEUS, 'Ανάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας IV. Sankt Petersburg 1891—1898, 367—400.
- V. Euthymii Vita Euthymii, ed. L. PETIT, Vie et office de saint Euthyme le Jeune. *ROC* 8 (1903) 155—205. 503 to 506. Repr. L. CLUGNET in: *Bibl. Hag. Or.* 5 (1904) 14—51.
- V. Lucae Styl. Vita Lucae Stylitae, ed. H. DELEHAYE, Les saints stylites (*Subsidia Hagiographica* 14). Bruxelles 1923, 195—237.
- V. Nikon Met. 'Ο Βίος Νίκωνος τοῦ Μετανοεῖτε, ed. SP. LAMPROS. *NE* 3 (1906) 129—228.
- V. Philareti Vita Philareti, edd. M.-H. FOURMY — M. LEROY, La vie de saint Philarète. *Byz* 9 (1934) 113—167.
- Vita retractata La vita retractata et les miracles postumes de saint Pierre d'Atroa, ed., trad. et comm. V. LAURENT (*Subsidia Hagiographica* 31). Bruxelles 1958.
- V. Steph. Iun. Vita Stephani iunioris, in: *PG* 100, 1069—1186.
- VSW *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. (Leipzig-) Wiesbaden 1903 ff.
- VV *Vizantiiskii Vremennik*, vols. 1—25. St. Petersburg (Leningrad) 1894—1927. New. ser. Moscow 1947 ff.
- ZACOS — VEGLERY G. ZACOS — A. VEGLERY, Byzantine Lead Seals I. Parts 1—3. Basel 1972.
- ZILLIACUS, Kampf H. ZILLIACUS, Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen im oströmischen Reich. Helsingfors 1935.

- Zonaras Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XIII usque ad XVIII, ed. TH. BÜTTNER-WOBST (*CSHB*). Bonn 1897.
- ZRVI *Zbornik Radova* (vols. 1—6: Vizantološki Institut, kn. 1—6 = Srpska Akademija Nauka, Zbornik Radova, kn. 21, 36, 44, 49, 59, 65) *Vizantološkog Instituta* (from vol. 7 [1961]). Belgrade 1952ff.

INTRODUCTION

The nature of the systems of military recruitment employed by the Byzantine state from the sixth to the tenth century has long been recognised as of central importance for a fuller understanding of a whole series of problems related to Byzantine social organisation and the administration of the empire. The present study is by no means an attempt to look at these problems in toto, but rather an examination of some key traits in the methods of recruitment of soldiers and the effects upon these of changing conditions. The form which the recruitment of soldiers took at various times during the period under review closely reflects on the one hand the needs of the state; and on the other hand the limitations of the social resources at its disposal. The ways in which the state was able to exploit these resources can tell us a good deal about the society which supported it, a point which hardly needs to be emphasised.¹

The following is therefore presented as a review of one aspect of the problem and as an attempt to produce an overall view of changes within the four centuries from Justinian I to Constantine VII. In so doing, it will seek to illuminate the development from the methods of the sixth century to those of the tenth.

The evidence will be examined in a more or less chronological order. The first part will deal with the sixth and early seventh century, that is to say up to the end of the reign of Heraclius. Part two will look at the tenth-century material, and part three will examine the process of change which led to the development of the so-called military estates.

Hitherto, it has been generally assumed that the legislation which was promulgated by the Macedonian emperors during the tenth century, aimed at protecting the *stratiōtai* from the encroachments of the *dynatoi*, attempted on the whole merely to define the status of the military holdings as they already existed; or to widen the application of this status to aid in the recruitment of troops. More important, it has been assumed without any real justification that the military service required from the holders of these "military lands" was attached to the holding itself — mainly because the

¹ See LEMERLE, *Esquisse*, esp. II 66, note 1. Cf. also 58, note 2.

legislation of the tenth century stresses this aspect in particular. In fact, as I will try to demonstrate, the service had until the first half of the tenth century been attached to an individual — the head of the family which had to supply a soldier and his equipment. This service had come to be supported chiefly through the holdings of those subject to this draft or military obligation, which, as I will also suggest, was hereditary. Only when the economic basis of this personal military obligation was threatened did the government step in to protect it. But since the situation appears by then already to have reached a fairly critical stage, the legislation, while outlining a considerable array of protective measures to prevent the holdings being swallowed up by big estates and to ease the position of the *stratiōtai*, seeks also to fix the previously purely personal and hereditary obligation of military service to the land.

It is quite clear why this step was taken. In the first place, it was very difficult to ensure that those with an obligation to military service did not either flee or place themselves under the protection of a powerful estate-owner, both courses of action effectively depriving the state of soldiers. In the second place, immovable land was easily kept under surveillance. It could be entered into the military muster-lists as well as the tax cadasters. It remained even if its occupiers vanished, and if the obligation to provide military service was fixed to the holding, then it was simply a question of ensuring that it was occupied — by whom was no longer so important. Hence the legislation of Constantine VII states that *all* lands which had supported a military obligation *must* now be registered — even those which had never before been recorded. The obligation became attached to the land — and consequently the concept of a hereditary service obligation began to fall into desuetude, although it is reflected in texts still in the eleventh century. Instead, the holdings could be transferred from one owner to another, but the military obligation stayed with it and had to be carried out by whoever occupied it. It could even be subdivided, but each part bore a proportional burden of the total obligation — a development which already in the mid-tenth century suggests a considerable degree of commutation of personal service and the beginnings of the fiscalisation of the *strateia* into a tax.

The origins of the system lie in the seventh century, and are connected with two fundamental developments. The first was a purely administrative change: the re-introduction of a hereditary

military service, passed on from father to son, during the difficult period of Heraclius' counter-offensive against the Persians. The second is the dispersal and localisation of the provincial armies as a result of and as a counter-measure to the Arab attacks. Soldiers settled down, became part of the communities where they were based, took up part-time employment or gained property in land. All these developments are known to have occurred in Italy, Egypt and Syria, where soldiers also were based locally for long periods without being transferred. This does not mean that the armies were part-time armies — although the tendency of both Byzantines and Arabs to campaign mostly in the summer and autumn seasons may often have meant this in practice. On the contrary, they retained their full-time status and were expected to fulfil the duties of regular, full-time troops. Irregular pay — almost a tradition in east Rome — became a regularity, and together with the effects of wide dispersal over often difficult terrain and considerable problems of supply, forced the scattered units to rely increasingly on their own resources and, to begin with at least, on those of their hosts, on whom they were billeted. Out of these beginnings grew the later "system" — if such it was — and it is to the earliest stages in its development that we shall now turn our attention.

A. THE SIXTH AND EARLY SEVENTH CENTURY AND THE "HERACLEIAN REFORM"

In spite of the wealth of documentary evidence which exists for the administrative organisation of the state during the sixth century, the methods by which soldiers were recruited have remained in dispute. The evidence suggests that by the reign of Justinian, recruitment was organised on a more or less voluntary basis, a point of view adopted by Jones.² The government laid great stress upon the enlistment of soldiers from areas within the empire inhabited by warlike peoples such as the Isaurians who, although enlisted into units which were a part of the regular establishment, were referred to by their national names and were raised for particular campaigns as the need arose.³

It has been objected, however, that conscription had not fallen completely out of use, or at least, that it was re-introduced during or shortly after the reign of Justinian. Since Jones hardly touched upon the objections, and since the point is so important for the later development of recruiting, it will be worth examining the matter in greater detail here.⁴

The evidence for this viewpoint lies chiefly in the content of several clauses retained in the Codex Iustinianus which deal with the exemptions from *protostasia* and *prototypia* on the one hand, and appear to require the sons of soldiers and *officiales* to register themselves in their father's profession on the other; and in addition, in the disappearance from the Codex of the clauses relevant to the *aurum tironicum*, the levy extracted in lieu of the surrender of men to the recruiting officer. It might thus suggest that a system of hereditary conscription as well as one of raising men from the land

² JONES, LRE 668; cf. also PERTUSI, *Ordinamenti* 663 f. Also MÜLLER, *Heer* 127; GROSSE, *Militärgeschichte* 301. For the system operated in the fourth and fifth century, see JONES, LRE 614 f.; GIGLI, *Reclutamento* 268 to 289. See also MOMMSEN, *Militärwesen* 245—253. See most recently PATLAGEAN, *L'Impôt payé par les soldats* 303—309, and the comments of R. DELMAIRE, *loc. cit.* 310.

³ See JONES, LRE 659—660; MÜLLER, *Heer* 107—109; and notes 11, 12 below.

⁴ STEIN, *Studien* 122; KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Contribution* 486 ff.; IDEM, *Entstehung* 41—44.

continued to be employed during and after Justinian's reign. But looked at in its context, this evidence is not as convincing as it at first sight appears.

That hereditary conscription was retained need not be doubted. But it was retained only in the *limitanei*, especially in "quiet" areas such as Egypt, where a peace-keeping force rather than fighting troops was required. In fact, such enrolment was regarded as a privilege rather than as a burden. In addition, it should be noted that all the clauses dealing with the exemptions are concerned not specifically with *capitularii*, for example, or *protostasia*, but rather with the release of certain categories of state officials from a variety of *munera*. The latter are placed one after another in lists which are clearly intended to be *inclusive*. It seems more likely that those responsible for noting the *munera* from which certain officials were to be freed did not go through each clause with a toothcomb and weed out every single anachronism. The retention of such terms within these clauses can hardly be used as evidence for the retention of the *munera* in question.⁵

One of the clauses in the Codex Iustinianus refers to the military grade of *biarcus*, a rank associated specifically with the new field units raised by Diocletian and Constantine and their successors (and therefore having nothing to do with the *limitanei*), and the rights of the sons of soldiers killed on active service to inherit their father's rank and emoluments.⁶ Thus Stein and later Karayannopoulos argued that this is evidence for the retention of hereditary conscription in military families,⁷ and that the disappearance of the *aurum tironicum* was compensated in two ways: by the main-

⁵ KARAYANNOPOULOS, Entstehung 42—43, lists the relevant clauses in CI: X 42.8; X 62.3 (for *protostasia* exemptions); XII 28.2/1; X 48.12/3; X 48.11 (referring to *capitularius* and *capitulum*); XII 28.2/1; XII 1.4; XII 21.1; X 48.12/3; XII 19.4 (dealing with *temonarii*). For the *limitanei*, cf. CI XII 47.1, 2; JONES, LRE 669; MASPÉRO, Organisation 49—53. The case of the Church estates in Sicily visited by *scriboness* "qui . . . tyrones colligunt" (cf. Greg., Register II 38) probably also refers to the *limitanei*, or to a local and temporary conscription. It is, as far as I am aware, the only reference to such a conscription at this time.

⁶ CI XII 47.3; JONES, LRE 634.

⁷ Cf. STEIN, Studien 122. The fact that such a measure — even if it did refer to hereditary conscription — had clearly lapsed before Maurice is a sign in itself that the process was not normal. It also calls into question the validity of such clauses in the CI in such arguments. See below.

tenance of hereditary conscription, and by the application of the *protostasia* or levy of recruits from estates and groups of tax-payers. The re-establishment of this system was the result of the scarcity of barbarian recruits and the difficulty of paying them, in the later sixth century. The big recruiting drive under Tiberius is the last that we hear of on a large scale, and later campaigns were carried out within the empire.⁸

The last point may be valid, but Maurice appears to have had no difficulty in recruiting from among Isaurians and Cappadocians. He also levied troops on quite a large scale from the allied Armenian princedoms and the Armenian territories under Roman authority.⁹ Persians captured in the eastern campaigns were also enrolled in the regular forces, as had happened under Justinian, and were probably posted to the west; while Theophylact Simocatta mentions in addition Apsich, a Hun who held a high command, and the Lombard Drocton, who held a similar post.¹⁰ The Illyrians referred to in the Strategikon can be compared with those raised by Justinian

⁸ See STEIN, *Studien* 58 and note 4 (79); KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Contribution* 487, for Tiberius' big recruiting campaign and the later scarcity of barbarians; also IDEM, *Entstehung* 42. The sixty thousand Lombards to whom John of Ephesus refers (241), although an inflated figure, suggests that Lombards were recruited at this time as well as Goths. See also Ioannes Biclar. 214, s. a. 575, who refers to Germanic recruits as "*gentes fortissimas, quae barbaro sermone Herinam nuncupantur*". *Herinam* appears to be a form of the Lombard word *Heriman* or *Ariman*, that is, a warrior or soldier. Cf. E. SCHRÖDER, in: *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 35 (1891) 172 f. On *Arimanni* see especially BERTOLINI, *Strutture sociali* 576 f. John's mention appears to confirm the recruitment of Lombards at this time. Tiberius attempted to recruit Lombards for the eastern campaigns in 578. See Menander Protector, frg. 49 (*HGM* II 101; Exc. de Leg. II 469).

⁹ For recruiting, John of Ephesus 188, 207; Evagrius, *HE* V 14 (214,28); Ioannes Epiph., frg. 5 (276); Theophyl. Simocatta III 12.4; Theophanes 251,24; Ioannes Biclar. 214. For Maurice, see John of Ephesus 409, 436; Sebeos 34—35, 36—37, 54. In the latter example, Maurice orders the raising of thirty thousand cavalry troops, to which end he decrees the establishment of the same number of families in Thrace, a clear example of military colonisation.

¹⁰ Cf. Evagrius, *HE* V 19 (215); for such units in Justinian's time see Proc., *BP* II 19.25; *BG* III 3.11 (Perso-Armenians); see also *BP* II 14.10; II 18.24; II 21.4 (Goths, Vandals and Heruls) and *BV* II 14.17 (Vandals). For Apsich, Theophyl. Simocatta I 14.6; and for Drocton II 17.9. See also MOMMSEN, *Militärwesen* 248; MÜLLER, *Heer* 110 f.

from both Thrace and Illyricum, troops who were attracted by relatively favourable conditions, a cash bounty and the expectation of regular pay.¹¹ There is no hint of a conscription at this time.

Maurice's attempted reform of the issue of the equipment allowance, and his introduction (or rather re-introduction) of state pensions for disabled veterans, throws more light on this problem, and especially on the matter of hereditary service obligations. Theophylact Simocatta described Maurice's reform briefly, but he included the essential details. Now the law in the Codex already referred to permits the enlistment of the son, or eldest son if there are more than one, upon the death of the father while on duty. The son is to succeed to his father's grade and allowance up to the rank of *biarcus*.¹² The reason is given as not for the purpose of maintaining numbers (although this was undoubtedly one result) but to provide for the dead soldier's family.¹³

The re-introduction of the same regulation by Maurice, although making no reference to the rank of the deceased, is ascribed by Theophylact to Maurice's philanthropy; and in fact both laws apply only to the sons of soldiers killed on service, as a means of providing for the dead man's kin, while the family thus retained

¹¹ Maurice, *Strategikon* II 5.4; II 8.2. See also Evagrius, *HE* V 14 (209) who includes in his list of troops raised by Tiberius Illyrians, Pannonians and Isaurians. The soldier Tychikos was recruited into the forces of John Mystakon in the 580s from Trebizond, and served twenty five years at least in Armenia and Syria. Cf. H. BERBÉRIAN, *Autobiographie d'Anania Širakac'i*. *REA* 1 (1964) 189—194, esp. 192—193; and the comments of P. LEMERLE, *Notes sur les données historiques de l'autobiographie d'Anania de Shirak*. *REA* 1 (1964) 195—202, see 197 f. For earlier recruitment of Illyrians see *Proc.*, BP II 21.4 (Thracians and Illyrians); BG II 5.1 (Thracians); IV 26.10 (regulars from Thrace); II 12.26 (Thracians and Isaurians); III 6.15 (Thracians); III 10.1—3 (Belisarius and Vitalius recruit four thousand Thracians); III 12.4 (Thracian and Illyrian recruits); III 39.9 (Germanus recruits troops from Thrace and Illyricum). Compare the list drawn up by DIEHL, *L'Exarchat* 197, note 14, of units in Italy, many of which are recruited from similar areas. Cf. also GUILLOU, *Régionalisme* 153 f., although many of his conjectures concerning the origins of units in Ravenna are dubious. See BROWN, *Italy* 118, note 98. For the importance of the cash incentive in such campaigns, cf. Theophyl. Simocatta III 12.4; Ioannes Epiph., *frg.* 5 (276); and by implication Theophanes 250, 15sq. See also *Proc.*, BG III 10.1—3.

¹² CI XII 47.3.

¹³ πρόδδλον γάρ, ὅτι ὁ μείζων ταύτην ἔχων τὴν παραμυθίαν φροντίζει καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἀδεσφῶν.

the various privileges it gained through its military member.¹⁴ This point is emphasised by the context in which Theophylact reports the reform. For the emperor's brother Peter had brought news of a series of changes; and whereas Theophylact places the reform dealing with the more rigid administration of pay among those changes which were unpopular and which the troops rejected, that with which we are concerned here was greeted as a popular measure by the soldiers. A move to apply hereditary conscription to all soldiers' sons would hardly have met with such a reception.¹⁵

Stein based his argument in favour of some form of conscription on three main points: the disappearance of the *adaeratio* (the *aurum tironicum*) for the compulsory levy; the reference to soldiers enlisted *ἐκ καταλόγου* in Evagrius; and a passage in the Strategikon imposing archery practice on all Roman *νεώτεροι* up to the age of forty.¹⁶ Stein read the term *neōteros* as youth. Thus the passage meant that all young Romans must practice with the bow, in other words that all young Romans were likely to be enlisted. But the term refers to recruits rather than young men, for the Strategikon usually uses the term *νεανίσκος* or *νέος* for young man. Since *neōteroi* can in any case be up to forty years of age, it is clear that the latter age is the upward limit for admission to the ranks as a recruit.¹⁷

With regard to the phrase *ek katalogou*, this is the normal term for describing soldiers already enlisted and on the military roll. The same phrase occurs frequently in Procopius, and similar phrases

¹⁴ Theophyl. Simocatta VII 1.7: ἦν δὲ τὰ φιλοτίμως ἐν αὐταῖς περιεχόμενα τάδε, . . . τοὺς δὲ παῖδας τῶν στρατευσαμένων καὶ ἐν πολέμοις ἀποβαλλόντας τοὺς φύσαντας ἀντὶ τῶν τεκόντων ἐγγράφεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

¹⁵ Note that the paragraphs of the Digesta (49, 16.4/11—12) listing the punishments for those who disable their sons in order to prevent them being called up, were omitted from the Strategikon (cf. I 8.1—6). The Strategikon applied quite specifically to the field troops, the *comitatenses*. The omission strongly suggests that such troops were, unlike the *limitanei*, to whom the Digesta regulations still applied, recruited voluntarily, and were conscripted neither by hereditary obligations nor by any other process.

¹⁶ See STEIN, Studien 122, and Evagrius, HE VI 11 (229); and Maurice, Strategikon I 2.4. According to STEIN, *loc. cit.*, "(sc. bezeichnet) das Strategikon des s. g. Mauricius . . . alle römischen Bürger bis zum 40. Lebensjahr als dienstpflichtig".

¹⁷ For *neōteros* as a recruit, cf. Strategikon VII 10a; VII 17a.12; XII 9.2 (= Οὐρβικίου ἐπιτήδευμα 2); XII 10.33. For *neos* and *neaniskos* cf. Strategikon I 2.3; I 5.2; VII 17a.2; XII 8.9/2; see AUSSARESES 10; PERTUSI, Ordamenti 664.

are used by Procopius and other writers to describe enlisted men. It would not normally imply a list of those liable to conscription except where the *limitanei* were concerned, and would in this case refer to those subject to a hereditary obligation. This may in fact be the case here, since the soldiers addressed by the Patriarch Gregory in the text were predominantly *limitanei*. In its context, the phrase means simply those who were enlisted as *limitanei*, or possibly those who were called out from the *limitanei* into the field army of Philipppicus.¹⁸

There is thus no substantial evidence to support the view that a form of conscription was applied. Indeed, the disappearance of the *adaeratio* suggests that the levy of recruits once imposed upon estates and communities, far from being re-introduced, had been completely abandoned. No references to the conscription occur, and it would be strange to find a government able to impose its will to the extent that no exemptions were granted or reported in any source.¹⁹ The two missing *novellae* of Tiberius, which Stein and Karayannopoulos suggest may have dealt with this matter, can hardly be used to support their argument. They may just as probably have dealt with the organisation of the new regiments formed by Tiberius from his barbarian recruits.

In this connection, Stein also stresses the reduction in foreign recruiting after the reign of Tiberius, and suggests that this also may have forced the government to reconsider conscription. But what evidence there is suggests rather that while the government relied increasingly on recruits from warlike peoples within the empire, it had no difficulty in filling the ranks. That Maurice refers in

¹⁸ E. g. Proc., BG II 23.2; III 39.6; IV 31.5: οἱ τῶν καταλόγων. Cf. also Proc., HA XXIV 5: τοὺς καταλόγους; XXIV 8: οἱ ἐν τοῖς καταλόγοις etc.; BP I 15.5: κατάλογος ἱππικός; BG II 5.1: στρατιῶται ἐκ καταλόγου ἱππικοῦ. In these examples, *katalogos* refers to the unit, an evolution from the original sense of muster-list. The passage of Evagrius suggests that these men were already soldiers, to whom the Patriarch of Antioch, Gregory, lent money or helped to equip. These appear to be the same troops whom Philipppicus raised in 584 on the eastern frontier. Cf. Theophyl. Simocatta I 13.3. That they were composed to a large degree of *limitanei* is suggested by the presence of the old unit *Legio Quarta Parthica*, based at Beroea, at a battle in 586; and also by their lack of resources and equipment. See Theophyl. Simocatta II 6.9: τοῦ καταλόγου . . . τῶν Κουαρτοπάρθων. Cf. Notitia Dig., Oriens XXXV 24.

¹⁹ As STEIN, Studien 122, would have it. Cf. also KARAYANNOPOULOS, Contribution 486.

his Strategikon to a whole division of Illyrians supports this. The difficulty in providing recruits to send to Italy illustrates not a shortage of recruits, but a shortage of available soldiers whom the emperor could send — in other words, a shortage of cash. A similar situation prevailed at times during Belisarius' Italian campaigns, although this was not the result of a lack of recruits. As Stein himself points out, the sudden dependence on citizens and allies led the state to rely especially on Armenians, who during the reign of Maurice, and especially of Heraclius, came to play an increasingly significant role, both militarily and politically.²⁰

Karayannopoulos, in his attempt to show that Justinian would not have hesitated to re-introduce conscription where necessary — “bien que les nombreux «κατάλογοι», les nombreux corps «nationaux», la mention des soldats «ἄρτι ἐκ τῆς γεωργίας εἰς τὰ πολεμικὰ ἔργα μεταστάντων» (= Procope, BP. I. 18 [97.19]), la permission accordée aux esclaves de pouvoir s'engager dans l'armée (= C.J. 12.33.7—a.531) prouve que Justinien devant un tel besoin de soldats, n'aurait pas hésité à appliquer un recrutement obligatoire, toutes les fois que le recrutement volontaire ne pouvait répondre aux besoins de l'état”²¹ shows in fact that Justinian (or his subordinates) took fairly extreme measures to avoid re-introducing conscription. Allowing slaves to join up, for example, was strictly precluded in both the Codex Theodosianus and the Codex Iustinianus,²² but had occurred once or twice during emergencies, such as during the revolt of Gildo in 397 or the invasion of Radagaisus

²⁰ STEIN, *Studien* 117, note 217; KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Contribution* 487; *Entstehung* 43—44. For the lack of troops to send to Italy, see Menander Protector, frg. 49 (*HGM* II 101; Exc. de Leg. II 469). Tiberius did gather a scratch force in 580 from praesental units, see frg. 62 (*HGM* II 121; Exc. de Leg. II 471). For the shortage of men in Italy under Justinian, see JONES, *LRE* 298 f. See in general TEALL, *Barbarians* 320 f., where the extreme difficulty of conscription is suggested, a procedure that would have deprived the land of able workers. Justinian and his successors had to rely on barbarians, both within and without the empire, and volunteers, a result of a general decline in population. See *ibid.* 305, note 39, and references on the latter. The importance of the frequent and damaging outbreaks of plague at this time should also be remembered in this context. STEIN indeed stresses the efforts of the empire to maintain its influence in Armenia for recruiting purposes. Had an operational conscription already been applied, this would hardly have been necessary. See in addition TEALL, *Grain Supply*, esp. 96 and note 25.

²¹ *Contribution* 488, note 1.

²² *CI* XII 43. proem; XII 33.6; *CTh* VII 13.8; 11; VII 18.9.

in 406.²³ Justinian's adoption of such a measure illustrates the lengths to which he went in order to avoid a conscription of free citizens, as do Maurice's efforts to enlist Armenians and indeed to establish colonies of Armenian soldiers.

As for the three other examples, the presence of *κατάλογοι* and national corps has nothing whatsoever to do with conscription, and the third is surely an exception. Those "newly recruited from the agricultural life", if not free men attracted by bounties, were presumably *coloni* surrendered under extreme conditions, or press-ganged, a form of conscription certainly, but of a temporary nature only. This is probably the explanation behind the presence of *scribonēs* in Sicily referred to in note 5 above. The same applies to the point made by Karayannopoulos with reference to the care to be taken by a *magister utriusque militiae* not to permit the enrolment of *coloni* or *saltuenses*, either voluntarily or against their will. Karayannopoulos assumes that this must refer to conscription. But it surely applies to the press-ganging of such men, an activity carried on by recruiting parties at all times; or to their running away from their estates to join the army.²⁴

²³ Cf. JONES, LRE 614. Conscription already existed at that time. See also MOMMSEN, *Militärwesen* 246, note 3; GROSSE, *Militärgeschichte* 199.

²⁴ Cf. Theophyl. Simocatta VII 3.6—7, for Peter's attempt to press-gang the garrison at Asemon. For KARAYANNOPOULOS' remarks see *Entstehung* 43, and cf. CI XII 33.3. KARAYANNOPOULOS questions the readiness of citizens of the empire to enlist, and raises the question of a possible "war-weariness" which would hinder voluntary recruitment. Cf. *Entstehung* 41. But in fact conditions in those areas most affected by war — the Balkans, for example — would promote rather than hinder recruitment. If the agricultural or pastoral livelihood of the population were destroyed, a steady, reliable source of income would be sought from other sources, service in the army being at least as likely as any other alternative.

The presence of considerable numbers of "Illyrians" in the Byzantine armies at this time may support this hypothesis. They are referred to not only in the *Strategikon* (II 5.3) but also in the *Acta M. Anastasii Persae* (ed. H. USENER. Bonn 1894) 26, based in Palestine in the 630s. These units (probably to be identified with the various units of *equites Illyriciani* of the *Notitia Dignitatum*, see W. E. KAEGI, JR., *Notes on Hagiographic Sources for Some Institutional Changes and Continuities in the early Seventh Century*. *Βυζαντινά* 7 [1975] 59—70) may well have been made up by this time predominantly of refugees from areas raided or occupied by the Avars and Slavs. On the other hand, areas quite unaffected by war — such as Isauria — had a well-established military tradition that would hardly be affected by a hypothetical "war-weariness". Note the comment of PATLAGEAN, *Pauvreté* 314.

In view of this accumulation of evidence, the view that widespread conscription was maintained or re-introduced on a permanent basis during the sixth century must, I think, be abandoned. Recruitment under Maurice and the emperors before him was voluntary. Regular field units were filled either from the local populace, if on garrison duty; or through the enlistment of citizens, barbarians and especially warlike peoples within the empire, attracted by generous cash bounties. When the cash ran out, then soldiers could not be hired, as the difficulties of maintaining the Italian forces demonstrate. The *limitanei* were kept up to strength by the enlistment of locals and by the retention of the hereditary obligation of soldiers' sons to serve.²⁵

With the reign of Heraclius, however, we enter a period of Byzantine history which remains one of the most inaccessible and obscure. Heraclius has been credited with far-reaching reforms of the state administration, not the least of which concerns the army and the recruitment of soldiers. He has been supposed by some to have been the founder of the later "theme system", a view most persistently defended by the late professor Ostrogorsky, and just as persistently attacked, on a wide variety of grounds, by a number of other historians. Since the problems still remain, even though the once generally accepted theory of a Heraclian reform is no longer popular, the evidence will again be reviewed, with the emphasis on Heraclius' supposed military reforms.

When Heraclius became emperor in 610, the imperial forces in the East were in a state of disorganisation, if not of chaos. Phocas' reign had seen a series of military set-backs in both East and West. The rebellion of the former *magister militum per Orientem*, Narses, in 603, and Persian attacks which thrust into the eastern provinces and Anatolia almost yearly from 604, led to a succession of reverses. The armies in Armenia and the East were defeated on several occasions, while the praesental troops also met defeat on at least one occasion in 609 near Antioch.²⁶ The situation as it was at the end

²⁵ For the recruitment of barbarians and other warlike groups within the empire, see notes 10 and 11 above; and for local enlistment in units of *limitanei* and *comitatenses*, see JONES, LRE 660—661, 669; OSTROGORSKY, L'Exarchat 102; DIEHL, L'Exarchat 317 f. See also the references in note 5 above.

²⁶ For an account of events during the reign of Phocas, see OSTROGORSKY, History 76—78. For the Persian attacks up to the year 609/610, cf.

of 610, when Heraclius replaced Phocas, has recently been analysed by Kaegi, who draws attention to further internal discord after Heraclius' coronation.²⁷ Of the Byzantine forces in the East, there was at least one cohesive division in Anatolia under Comentiolus, another brother of Phocas; but apart from this, and the troops of Nicetas in Egypt, we hear of no major Byzantine armies. The events which followed reinforce such a view; not only had Heraclius no substantial force with which to oppose Comentiolus; Priscus, who succeeded to the command of the latter's army, bottled the Persians up in Caesarea for a year, but received no reinforcements, and when the Persians broke out, they faced a clear route home.²⁸

After the Persian escape from Caesarea, Roman troops remained in Cappadocia and Cilicia, which now constituted a frontier zone, while the Persians proceeded to occupy all the eastern provinces and to take most of the major cities outside Asia Minor during the following six or seven years, with little opposition except that offered by small local units and garrisons.²⁹

Heraclius' re-organisation of the empire's military resources does not appear to have begun in earnest until 621/622, when he transferred the majority of the troops left in Europe to Asia Minor.³⁰ Apart from the united field forces — those in Cilicia and Cappadocia

STRATOS, Τὸ Βυζάντιον στὸν Ζ' αἰῶνα I 140—159; A. PERNICE, L'Imperatore Eraclio. Firenze 1905, 10 f., 18 f.

²⁷ KAEGI, *New Evidence* 308—330. For events after Heraclius' succession, OSTROGORSKY, *History* 83—86, 90—93.

²⁸ KAEGI, *New Evidence* 313—315, 324 f. See also Sebeos 65.

²⁹ On the rapid Persian advance and their successes after 612, see Theophanes 299,32—33; 300,1—6, 20—21 (for 614); 300,30sq. (615); 301,9sq. (616 to 617) etc. For an account of these wars, see STRATOS, Τὸ Βυζάντιον στὸν Ζ' αἰῶνα I 252 f.; PERNICE, *op. cit.* 58 f. Three main Byzantine forces appear to have been involved in the eastern wars at this time: that originally under Comentiolus, then Priscus and finally Philippicus, operating chiefly in Armenia and Cappadocia; that which had arrived in Egypt with Nicetas, who had been appointed *comes excubitorum*; and that with which Heraclius moved into Syria in 613, drawn probably from the praesental forces and the troops under Philippicus. Cf. Sebeos 66—68.

The presence of a temporary mint, established at Seleucia in Cilicia from 615—617 and moved in 617/618 to Isaura (cf. GRIERSON, *DOC II* 327 f.) and of an otherwise unattested arms-factory at Seleucia (ZACOS — VEGLEBY no. 1136) suggests that Heraclius left this force here at this time to protect the Cilician approaches to Asia Minor and Constantinople.

³⁰ Theophanes 320,27—30.

— now under Heraclius' personal command, there were only isolated groups and garrisons scattered throughout Asia Minor and in the few eastern cities which had managed to avoid capture by the Persians. According to George of Pisidia, the various units in Anatolia flocked to Heraclius' standard. He re-organised these troops, and embarked upon a period of training and exercising the reformed army.³¹ While the troops in Anatolia were certainly in no condition to undertake offensive operations, they had by no means lost all order; for when Heraclius arrived in Bithynia, he informed them by letter of the assembly point, and it appears that they were able to march to his standard fairly quickly.³²

The troops were reformed in central Asia Minor. So much is clear from Sebeos' statement that Heraclius sent orders to the troops to gather at Caesarea in Cappadocia, taken but later abandoned by the Persians, to which he travelled from Pylai, near Chalcedon. From there Theophanes reports that Heraclius marched ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν θεμάτων χώρας.³³

This phrase has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate, for Theophanes may be referring here to the later *themata* or military provinces. The word *thema* also occurs in Theophanes' text for the year 611/612, a passage convincingly re-dated by Oikonomidès to the year 626. Ostrogorsky suggested that Theophanes' second mention may be used in a fixed geographical sense, of the *themata* as both military and civil districts.³⁴

In spite of his arguments, the most that can be said about the use of the word *thema* at this time is that it means military units, corps and divisions of armies. Heraclius examined the *themata* in 611/612 (now 626/627 after Oikonomidès), and he established his headquarters in the districts where they were billeted in 621/622. Baynes' original proposal that the term is used anachronistically

³¹ Exp. Persica II 66 f. for the soldiers joining his standard; and Theophanes 303,10sq.; Exp. Persica II 44 f., 120 f. for the training and reorganisation of the army.

³² For the condition of the troops, cf. Exp. Persica II 44 f., 55 f., and Theophanes 303,24sq. For Heraclius' written messages, Exp. Persica II 38, 54.

³³ Cf. Sebeos 81; Exp. Persica II 8—11; Theophanes 303,8—10. For the lands τῶν θεμάτων, Theophanes 303,10—11; and see OIKONOMIDÈS, Les premiers mentions 1—8, who shows that the first reference in Theophanes to the *themata*, normally dated to the year 612, applies in fact to 626/627.

³⁴ Theophanes' first mention, 300,4—6. Cf. OSTROGORSKY, La Date 48 f.; IDEM, History 90, note 4.

by Theophanes has been refuted by Oikonomidès; but the latter goes on to assert that the *themata* were by 626/627 military districts based on new methods of recruitment introduced by Heraclius in 622. If this were the case, the phrase ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν θεμάτων χώρας would have to mean that Heraclius did a grand tour of Asia Minor, visiting several regions distant from one another. On the evidence of Sebeos and George of Pisidia it cannot be interpreted in this way. Heraclius marched to Cappadocia — to Caesarea — where he set up his headquarters and began the re-organisation of his troops.³⁵

In fact, the evidence adduced for the existence of a "thematic" military organisation established under Heraclius demonstrates simply a change in terminology which had begun already in the later sixth century, and which accompanied a change in the tactical structure of the field armies undertaken during the reigns of Tiberius Constantine and Maurice.³⁶ The appearance of words such as

³⁵ For OSTROGORSKY's arguments, see La Date 48 f., 54—55, 64—66; for BAYNES' suggestion, see The Emperor Heraclius and the Military Theme System. *EHR* 67 (1952) 380—381; and cf. W. ENSSLIN, Der Kaiser Herakleios und die Themenverfassung. *BZ* 46 (1953) 364. See also F. DÖLGER, Ableitung 189, note 1. Summaries of the arguments on the beginning of the themes are to be found in KARAYANNOPOULOS, Contribution 462 f.; PERTUSI, La Formation 1—15, 25 f.; ANTONIADIS-BIBICOU, Histoire Maritime 50—51, accepts the OSTROGORSKY thesis. For a more recent survey see LILIE, Die byzantinische Reaktion 287 f. KARAYANNOPOULOS has stressed that Theophanes uses the word *thema* to mean both armies and administrative districts, a point accepted by OSTROGORSKY in relation to Theophanes' first reference (in fact the later of the two references). But this immediately reduces the force of his argument concerning the reference of 621/622.

³⁶ As PERTUSI, La Formation 33, has noted, titles such as *turnmarch* were already current before Heraclius, a point which OSTROGORSKY did not pursue. Cf. G. OSTROGORSKY, Die Entstehung der Themenverfassung. Korreferat zu A. PERTUSI, La Formation des thèmes byzantins, in: Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongreß, part VII, München 1958, 1—8, see 5. See also KARAYANNOPOULOS, Entstehung 21. OSTROGORSKY was incorrect to maintain that there can be no "theme" officers before the "theme" system (La Date 49) — if by "theme" officers are meant, for example, *turnmarchs* and *drugars*. But KARAYANNOPOULOS is likewise wrong to insist that the presence of such titles denotes even a military theme (as opposed to an administrative one). Such titles may quite simply reflect changing terminology within the established system. See Entstehung 31—32. For Maurice's reforms, see Menander Protector, frg. 58 (*HGM* II 113,9—17; Suda s. v. ἀπετάφρευον [Suidae Lexicon, ed. ADA ADLER, part I. A—Γ. Leipzig 1928, 276,12—18 (Nr. 3080)]); frg. 59 (*HGM* II 113; Exc. de Sent. 24) and cf. frg. 55 (*HGM* II 111,3—8; Exc. de Leg. 216,8—12); Maurice, Strategikon

τούρμα, θέμα and δρούγγος — the first of Latin, the second of Greek and the third of Germanic origin — to describe divisions of the army; the subsequent creation of new titles to describe the officers in charge of them (τουρμάρχης and δρουγγάριος) are to be seen as a reflection of such changes, and perhaps also as the adoption of everyday soldiers' terms in official parlance.³⁷ At the same time, a process of linguistic hellenisation was going on, which served to freeze to some extent the technical terminology of the later sixth century. It is significant that virtually all the technical terms and titles associated with the later thematic organisation are already present in the Strategikon — βάνδον, δρούγγος, κόμης/τριβούνος, βανδοφόρος, κεντάρχη, δεκάρχης and so forth — a mixture of Latin, German and Greek words.³⁸

proem. 2, 3; XII 8. proem. For attempted reforms before Maurice, see Theophyl. Simocatta III 12.7; and for the general interest in military science at the time, see Theophyl. Simocatta I 14.1—4 on the studies of Philip-picus.

³⁷ The fact that a *tourmarchēs* is not mentioned until 626/627 (Theophanes 325,3) should not mislead us into thinking that before this there were no *tourmai* — it is merely suggestive of the gradual rate at which such terms became widely adopted. The term δρούγγος for example appears frequently in the Strategikon: I 3.6; II 1.6; II 2.1; XII 8.20/7—8; but the first δρουγγάριος we hear of appears only in 627—628. See Chronicon Paschale 731,5: Θεόδοτον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπέστατον δρουγγάριον. Note that he rode in the company of Ἕλαν, τὸν ἐνδοξότατον στρατηλάτην (*ibid.*, 731,4), probably a *magister militum*. For the origin of the word *turma*, see ZILLIACUS, Kampf 144; PERTUSI, La Formation 33, note 157. For δρούγγος and βάνδον see G. STADTMÜLLER, Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen (ca. 1138—ca. 1222) (*Orientalia Christiana* XXXIII/2 [91]). Rome 1934, 301—305, and ZILLIACUS, Kampf 145.

³⁸ For the date of the Strategikon, see GY. MORAVCSIK, La tactique de Léon le Sage comme source historique hongroise. *AHASH* 1 (1952) 163 f.; A. DAIN, Les stratégistes byzantins. *TM* 2 (1967) 344 f. H. MIHĂESCU (Maurice, Strategikon 8 f.) reviews all previous discussions on the subject. For the hellenisation, see ZILLIACUS, Kampf 126, 141—167; L. HAHN, Zum Gebrauch der lateinischen Sprache in Konstantinopel, in: Festgabe für Martin von Schanz. Würzburg 1912, 178 f.; H. MIHĂESCU, Les termes de commandement militaires latins dans le Stratégicon de Maurice. *RL* 14/3 (1969) 262 f. See also H. ZILLIACUS, Das lateinische Lehnwort in der griechischen Hagiographie. *BZ* 37 (1937) 302—344, esp. 307. On ZILLIACUS' Kampf see the remarks of F. DÖLGER in *BZ* 36 (1936) 108—117, and more recently H. MIHĂESCU, Die Lage der zwei Weltsprachen (Griechisch und Latein) im byzantinischen Reich des 7. Jahrhunderts als Merkmal einer Zeitwende, in: Studien zum 7. Jhdt. 95—100.

Oikonomidēs has recently argued in favour of Ostrogorsky's thesis and, as I have already mentioned, proposed that by 626/627 the *themata* were military provinces, whose forces were raised by new methods of recruitment introduced by Heraclius in or shortly before 622.³⁹ In addition to the objections already raised, and the extensive evidence for the continuity of both civil and military administrative forms familiar from the sixth century,⁴⁰ there are a number of weaknesses in the argument. The case is based essentially on the appearance of the word *thema* for the first time in 621/622 and 626/627, and likewise of a *logothetēs* in the latter year.⁴¹ He suggests that the two should be linked and that both are a result of a reform of Heraclius in which (a) recruitment was re-organised and based on military land-holdings, and (b) the post of *logothetēs tou stratiōtikou* was established to supervise the *kōdikēs* or *themata*.⁴²

But a *logothetēs* appears already in 602/603 in the person of Constantine Lardys, and as I have suggested, the term (if it does refer to an official *tou stratiōtikou*, which Oikonomidēs assumes for the 626/627 reference in the Paschal Chronicle) probably denotes simply a centralisation of military finances. It might equally be

³⁹ OIKONOMIDĒS, Les premiers mentions.

⁴⁰ See HALDON, Some Remarks 166 f.; LILLIE, Die byzantinische Reaktion 292 f. Cf. also LILLIE, „Thrakien“ und „Thrakesion“ 13 f. The existence of a distinct region under its own commander, referred to as „Armeniakon“ in 639/640, need signify no more than the presence of the *magister militum per Armeniam*, who, like other officers of the same rank, commanded troops within a distinct region. The term *Armeniakon* is simply a part of that process of hellenisation already referred to (whether or not the word demonstrates a „latin“ accentuation, as PERTUSI, La Formation 32; IDEM, Nuova ipotesi sull'origine dei „temi“ bizantini. *Aevum* 28 [1954] 143, note 3, suggests); while the apparent age of the Armeniak theme is easily explained when it is recalled that the areas under the *magister* of the sixth century and the *stratēgos* of the seventh and eighth century were to a large extent co-terminous. Baladhuri's Armeniak district is no more than the military zone under the *magister*; although there is no reason to doubt that the forces of the *magistri militum per Armeniam* and *per Orientem* were already falling back to new positions in Asia Minor and were in the process of becoming „*themata*“ under „*stratēgoi*“ in the 640s. Cf. W. E. KAEGI, JR., Al-Baladhuri and the Armeniak Theme. *Byz* 38 (1968) 273–277; IDEM, The First Expedition against Amorium. *BMGS* 3 (1977) 19–22.

⁴¹ Θέματα: Theophanes 300,4–6; 303,10sq.; λογοθέτης: Chronicle Paschale 721,8.

⁴² Les premiers mentions 6–8.

linked with the reforms of Maurice's reign.⁴³ In addition, it is not at all certain that the early military *logothetes* had anything to do with military holdings, in the officially-defined sense of a later period, which are themselves only firmly evidenced in official documents from the tenth century. Because the later *logothetes* had such functions, it does not follow that their predecessors had similar duties.⁴⁴

A further objection lies in the time necessary to organise and administer the measurement and distribution of the envisaged holdings and to settle the soldiers. It seems unlikely that Heraclius could have accomplished all this before 621/622; especially in view of the activities of the Persians at this time; and George of Pisidia, who extols Heraclius' efforts to restore discipline and morale among the soldiers, makes no mention of any such reforms, even obliquely. Surely he would not have missed an opportunity to praise the emperor's beneficence and generosity such as this supposed reform would have presented.

Finally, Oikonomidès suggests that the names of the later *themata* — 'Αρμενιάκον, 'Ανατολικόν etc. — reflect the original recruitment of the soldiers from these areas. This geographical nomenclature has nothing to do with recruitment, however, but rather with the original areas in which the soldiers were stationed — that the

⁴³ HALDON, *Some Remarks* 168. For fiscal reform and centralisation between 627 and 630 see M. HENDY, *On the Administrative Basis of the Byzantine Coinage*, c. 400—900 and the Reforms of Heraclius. *BUHJ* 12/2 (1970) 148 f. For Constantine Lardys, see *Chronicon Paschale* 694,8: Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Ἀάρδης, ἀπὸ ἐπάρχων γενόμενος πραιτωρίων καὶ λογοθέτης καὶ κουράτωρ τῶν Ὀρμίσδου. As far as I can see, there is absolutely no justification for identifying the Θεοδόσιος ὁ ἐνδοξότατος πατρίκιος καὶ λογοθέτης of *Chronicon Paschale* 721,8 with a logothete of the *stratiōtikon*, as R. GUILLAND, *Études sur l'histoire administrative de l'empire byzantin: Les logothètes*. *REB* 29 (1971) 25—26 and note 9, does, followed by OIKONOMIDÈS, *Les premiers mentions* 6 and note 23. Neither the context in the *Chronicon Paschale* nor the title itself permit such a positive identification. See KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit* 69—70, who argued convincingly against the identity of this logothete with the *stratiōtikos logothetēs*, first proposed by E. STEIN, *Ein Kapitel vom persischen und vom byzantinischen Staat*. *BNJ* 1 (1920) 74—75, and repeated by OSTROGORSKY, *Geschichte* 83, note 3, upon which the views of GUILLAND/OIKONOMIDÈS are founded.

⁴⁴ See, for example, LEMERLE, *Esquisse* I 70—74, 254 f., and the bibliography therein. See also KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 72—88. More recently LILLIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 311 f.

two *later* became co-terminous is, of course, a different matter. For the real significance of these apparently regional names we need look no further than the armies of the *magistri militum per Armeniam* and *per Orientem*, as Diehl showed.⁴⁵

In spite of Oikonomidès' plea, therefore, no evidence for a "Heraclian reform" of the wide-ranging nature envisaged has been produced. But this does not mean that Heraclius made no alterations at all in the administration of the army as he found it. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that he did introduce certain changes in the administration of recruitment, although not of the nature foreseen by Ostrogorsky.

It is now generally assumed that Heraclius re-organised the forces in Asia Minor in 621/622, and at the same time recruited a sizeable new force, which he then trained and equipped. The basis of these assumptions is a text of Theophanes:

ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν θεμάτων χώρας ἀφικόμενος συνέλεγε τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ προσετίθει αὐτοῖς νέαν στρατείαν. τούτους δὲ γυμνάζειν ἤρξατο καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ ἔργα ἐξεπαίδευσεν.⁴⁶

If we compare the texts of George of Pisidia, however, upon which Theophanes based much of his information about Heraclius' activities at this time, then I think it will be seen that there is little justification for this assumed recruitment:

στρατὸν γὰρ εὐρών τὸ πρὶν ἐκ ῥαθυμίας
(.)
ἀταξίας γέμοντας, ἡμελημένους,
θᾶττον κατορθοῖς καὶ λόγοις καὶ σχήμασι,
τυπῶν, διαιρῶν, δεικνύων, ὑπογράφων
ὧς παιδαγωγὸς τῶν ἐνόπλων γραμμάτων.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For the Persians in Asia Minor and the dislocation they caused, see now C. FOSS, *The Persians in Asia Minor and the End of Antiquity*. *EHR* 357 (Oct. 1975) 721—747; and also IDEM, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis*. Cambridge/Mass. and London 1976, 15 f. For the regional armies, see CH. DIEHL, *L'Origine du régime des thèmes dans l'empire byzantin*, in: IDEM, *Études Byzantines*. Paris 1905, 276—292, esp. 290 f.

⁴⁶ Theophanes 303,10—13. See for example KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 52—55; N. OIKONOMIDÈS, *A Chronological Note on the first Persian Campaign of Heraclius (622)*. *BMGS* 1 (1975) 1—9, cf. 8—9.

⁴⁷ Exp. Persica II 44sq. Cf. also II 55sq.

ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ στρατοῦ συναρμόσης
εἰς πολλὰ τῆς γῆς ἐσκεδασμένον μέρη

No reference to new recruits or a recruitment occurs in George of Pisidia — certainly not enough to deserve mention. Instead, he refers merely to a re-assembly of disorganised troops, and stresses that the condition of the majority was so bad, that the emperor had to begin more or less from the beginning to retrain them all.⁴⁸

Hence Theophanes' reference τούτους δὲ γυμνάζειν ἤρξατο need refer to new recruits only if we interpret νέα στρατεία as such. But the phrase does not normally bear such a meaning. *Strateia* (= *militia*) in the later Roman and Byzantine period signified membership of an official *ordo* and the exercise of certain duties, usually within the civil, military or ecclesiastical apparatus.⁴⁹ It seems much more likely that Theophanes was using the word in this (for him) everyday sense, and that we must therefore re-interpret the sentence. Now προστίθῃμι can also mean "impose upon/in addition to" or "attribute to". If we look again at this statement προσετίθει αὐτοῖς νέαν στρατείαν, is it not more likely that it is to be interpreted in the following sense: that Heraclius, having collected his scattered troops, imposed new duties or new conditions of service upon them?

Two alternatives present themselves for consideration. *Strateia* might also mean "discipline", which would fit in with what George

— δέος γὰρ ἦν οὐ φαῦλον, ὥστε μὴ φθάσας
τὰ διαιρεθέντα τοῦ στρατοῦ σου τάγματα
σχίσῃ παρελθὼν ἐν μέσοις ὁ βάρβαρος . . .

and compare Theophanes 303, 24—6 : εὐρών δὲ τὸν στρατὸν εἰς ῥαθυμίαν πολλήν καὶ δειλίαν, ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀκοσμίαν (καθεστῶτα) καὶ εἰς πολλὰ τῆς γῆς μέρη ἐσπαρμένον συντόμως πάντας εἰς ἓν συνήγαγεν.

⁴⁸ Further support comes from Exp. Persica II 175—176:

οὕτως ἅπαντας τοὺς πρὶν ἡμελημένους
θᾶττον διδάξας εἶχεσ ἡύτρεπισμένους,

which seems to imply the re-training of men who were out of practice rather than the training of fresh recruits; or that they received new equipment. The passage at II 163sq., if not simply an elaborate hyperbole on the various troops in the imperial forces, refers to the various allies — notably Chazars — whom Heraclius employed in his campaigns. It is to these troops that the Georgian chronicler of Heraclius (cited in M. VAN ESBROECK, Une chronique de Maurice à Heraclius dans un récit des sièges de Constantinople. *BK* 34 [1976] 93) refers for the year 626. See T. S. BROWN — A. BRYER — D. WINFIELD, Cities of Heraclius. *BMGS* 4 (1978) 15—38, esp. 22 f. Theophanes, of course, had a now lost source at his disposal in addition to Pisides, from which it is generally supposed his reference to the νέα στρατεία comes. As I will show, however, even if this is the case, the phrase has generally been wrongly interpreted.

⁴⁹ See most recently OIKONOMIDÈS, Préséance 283 f.

of Pisidia reports — that Heraclius had to impose discipline and order on the troops. This use of the word, however, is unusual.⁵⁰

Alternatively, and closer to the first proposal made above, the phrase might refer to a stricter re-application of hereditary enlistment, which, as I have shown, had lapsed during or before Justinian's reign. Heraclius may have decided that such a measure was necessary in order to maintain the strength of the army in the future — a consideration which would account for the imposition of the *nea strateia* on those already enlisted, and the fact that George of Pisidia does not refer to new recruits. Indeed, the situation of the empire at this time would have made such a move far more reasonable, and necessary, than hitherto. A fruitful source of recruits, the Balkans, was now almost entirely removed from imperial authority, while Asia Minor itself was in a state of disorganisation. Foreign recruiting had already been drying up during the last years of the sixth century, whereas internal recruitment, as stressed above, was maintained. Now, even these sources were no longer available. In the circumstances, the only reasonable move was a return to hereditary service, if only to maintain the already reduced numbers of imperial troops at a serviceable level.⁵¹ It is

⁵⁰ LIDDELL and SCOTT cite only one reference to the term in this sense.

⁵¹ KARAYANNOPOULOS, Entstehung 53—54, seeks to show that the term means "new army" or "new force" by comparing it with a second occurrence in Theophanes 315,1sq., when Chosroes νέαν ἐποιήσατο στρατεῖαν στρατεύσας ξένους τε καὶ πολίτας καὶ οἰκέτας, ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἐκλογὴν ποιούμενος. But again, I think the term *strateia* is here to be interpreted otherwise, as "(imposition of) service/duty", that is to say, as military service. For why else should there follow the verb, which would stand quite effectively on its own, and a list of those raised in this extraordinary levy (which is without doubt what it was) including foreigners as it did? It is to be remembered that Theophanes generally uses the terms στρατός, στράτευμα, στρατόπεδον or λαός for armies, not στρατεία, which had a quite definite meaning — that suggested for the passages above. For the normal use of the word — as "(military) service" — in the fifth and sixth centuries, see for example, SEG, no. 11; BEŠEVLEV, Inschriften, no. 240. See further DU CANGE, Gloss. Graec. 1457 to 1458; and Evagrius, HE III 39 (137,21); Lydus 196,14,21, 202,10,17, 221,9—10,12, 222,6sq. BEKKER (88,17,26, 95,1,8, 116,1,4,22sq. WÜNSCH), and cf. especially 260,9—10 BEKKER (157,10 WÜNSCH); there are several other examples in Lydus, all applying to the bureaucracy. See also Maurice, Strategikon I 6.3; IX 3.18. For the later, more technical but nevertheless similar use of the term, see JGR I 204 (and see note 79 below) where *nea strateia* refers to the new obligations on those with a *strateia* imposed by Nicephorus II. For the various meanings of *strateia* in the ninth/eleventh

quite probable that Heraclius used the excuse of the forthcoming strenuous campaigns against the Persians to justify this change in service conditions, which at other times would have aroused considerable opposition; and that he skillfully exploited the fervour of the troops to gain their approbation.⁵²

Such a move on the part of the emperor would go a long way towards explaining the appearance of the word *thema* at this time. In order to cater for the revised regulations, lists of those affected will have to have been drawn up anew. It is not unlikely that a relatively new term was employed to describe them, a term which, as Dölger suggested, soon came to be applied also to the corps or divisions registered in the lists, and ultimately to the areas where these corps were stationed.⁵³

Thus Heraclius may have been responsible for certain administrative reforms — namely the re-introduction of hereditary military service. If the logothete referred to in the *Chronicon Paschale* for 626 is a military official, then he would certainly have played a rôle, as supervisor of the new lists. But that is to be expected and would in no way alter his function as chief paymaster, a function which may have existed since Maurice's day.⁵⁴ I see no reason for

century see AHRWEILER, *Administration* 11, note 2. Note that its use in the sense of army is infrequent and bears in any case a very general meaning. Cf. Maurice, *Strategikon* X 2.10.

⁵² Pisides makes it very clear that Heraclius sought the approval of the troops before beginning the campaign, and in order to justify the hard training which took place. *Exp. Persica* II 88sq.; cf. Theophanes 303,23sq. That the hereditary obligation was not altogether popular among the regular, mobile troops of the field army is strongly suggested by the *Leg. Mil.* (ASHBURNER) 23, which retain the older penalties for soldiers who disable their sons in order to prevent their enlistment. Cf. *Digesta* 49, 16.4/11—12; and also *Leg. Mil.* 22 and note 83 below. ⁵³ Cf. DÖLGER, *Ableitung*.

⁵⁴ For the logothete see *Chronicon Paschale* 721,8; and OIKONOMIDÈS, *Les premiers mentions* 6. For the appearance of the first *logothetēs*, see GUILLAND, *art. cit.* (note 43 above) 25—26 and note 9, bearing in mind the reservations expressed in note 43. That Heraclius did nothing more than reimpose regulations on the hereditary obligations of soldiers' sons may be borne out by two factors: (a) hereditary service was clearly central to the later recruitment of these soldiers; (b) there appears still to have been no general recruitment based on property and/or tax liabilities in the early ninth century, as is suggested by Theophanes' report that Nicephorus ordered a general census — ἐποπτεύσθαι πάντας — (Theophanes 486,27). The administrative equipment for such a system does not appear to have existed before this time.

considering Heraclius' enforcement of this obligation as anything more than the reintroduction of an older principle, which will in any case (and especially in the circumstances of the time) have taken several years to effectively implement. That it had anything to do with military holdings or the *themata* as administrative districts is not borne out by the evidence.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ For the operation of the old system, cf. JONES, LRE 614 f. OIKONOMIDÈS implied that the "new" recruiting system was established quite quickly, and before 621/622. See *art. cit.* (note 46 above) 8—9. If the phrase *nea strateia* has been correctly interpreted, this will be seen to be unlikely. In 621/622 Heraclius busied himself with reorganising the already existing forces; there is no question as yet of exploiting the results of the "conscription". The suggestion of J. L. TEALL, *The Byzantine Agricultural Tradition*. DOP 25 (1971) 50, who considers that Heraclius may have been forced to settle his soldiers "on the land" rather than maintain them in garrisons, is interesting — and may well be true of the provincial administration during the 660s and after — but it is to my mind refuted by the sources, which continue to speak in terms of the old system — with garrisons in towns and cities as before. It is worth stressing that after the return to the empire of Syria, Palestine and Egypt by the Persians, there would have been little point in maintaining troops in Asia Minor (excluding Armenia and the easternmost border districts) which would naturally have been viewed once more as a "safe" central region of the empire. See PERTUSI, *La Formation* 34.

DÖLGER, *Ableitung*, argues on the whole for a gradual development according to changing circumstances, a position discussed in full by KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 16 f. and esp. 35. But DÖLGER also believed that Theophanes' use of the word *thema* for 611/612 (= 626 after OIKONOMIDÈS) is anachronistic, as argued by BAYNES, for example, and more recently by A. TOYNBEE, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World*. London 1973, 234; a point of view which OIKONOMIDÈS has in my view refuted. It is certainly true that the word is used rarely, and normally refers to a military corps (KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 35; DÖLGER, *Ableitung* 192, note 1), but it may well have been used in a limited and official sense at first, only later appearing in popular usage. Whether the word is used anachronistically or not, however, it does not affect materially the argument elaborated above.

DÖLGER was inclined also to accept the title *τοῦρμαρχης τῶν Ἀρμενιάκων* as an anachronism (cf. Theophanes 325,3); or to see in it the establishment of a new defensive region in Armenia, with new titles for its officers, following STEIN, *Studien* 127—129; PERTUSI, *Nuova ipotesi* (*art. cit.*, note 40 above) 17 f. As I have argued above, however, there is no good reason for regarding the term as anachronistic; while it certainly need not represent any new organisational establishment.

Finally, DÖLGER pointed out in the list of armies in Justinian II's letter of 687, that while the term *thema* is not used, the titles of the new armies are (Armeniakon, Anatolikon etc.) which, he conjectures, means that the "theme organisation" had already been erected. Cf. also PERTUSI, *Nuova ipotesi*

There was, therefore, a limited change in the system of recruitment under Heraclius, and it was perhaps this change, together with only a vague knowledge of the events of the seventh century, which led Constantine VII to ascribe so much to his illustrious predecessor. But there is enough evidence available to confirm that in other respects, the older military and civil establishment survived until, at the very least, the middle of the seventh century intact. Officials bearing titles familiar from the preceding period continue to be mentioned in the sources until the 650s and 660s; and while the forces of the empire were certainly re-distributed and established in new localities as a result of the Arab attacks, the older system was only gradually replaced by a new one which could provide more effectively for the needs of the new situation. The most important aspects of the changes for our purposes are the gradual localisation of the forces and the growth of distinctly territorial armies — troops both recruited and stationed in their home area — and the limited resources henceforth available to pay and equip such troops.⁵⁶ I will return to this theme below.

The period which follows Heraclius' reign is if anything even less accessible to the historian. Evidence for the administrative organisation of the empire as a whole is very sparse; and it is impossible to say whether the reintroduction of hereditary obligations to military service by Heraclius was later withdrawn. It seems most probable that it was not. But to demonstrate why, it will now be necessary to move on to the sources for a later period, when the so-called theme system has reached its full development.

9—10. On the contrary, these names prove no more than that the armies of Oriens and Armenia had had their names hellenised. Since we are now in the 680s, it might reflect the establishment of new, officially delineated provinces. Again, it need by no means reflect a reorganisation based on the pattern of Heraclius' supposed Armenian reform.

⁵⁶ See HALDON, *Some Remarks* 171 f., and LILIE, „Thrakien“ und „Thrakesion“ 12 f.

B. THE "MILITARY LANDS" ACCORDING TO THE NINTH- AND TENTH-CENTURY EVIDENCE

Recent analyses of the evidence — notably those of Lemerle, Karayannopoulos and Ahrweiler — have generally promoted a viewpoint which, in the extreme form expressed by Karayannopoulos, denies any connection between the themes, military service and military lands altogether before the ninth and tenth centuries.⁵⁷ I should like here to go over once more the evidence for these assertions. Beginning with the tenth-century material, I will attempt to follow the system as it appears in the surviving sources back to its origins.

The key texts with which to open the discussion are the legal pronouncements of the tenth century which relate to the "military lands". Leaving aside for the moment the reasons for their promulgation and their effectiveness, we can elicit certain fundamental details.

The first text is a novel of Constantine VII issued between 945 and 959, *Περὶ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν*.⁵⁸ The author begins by noting that what has previously been a custom — namely that those lands which support the *strateia* or military obligations should not be sold by the *stratiotai* — is now to be fixed by law.⁵⁹ The constitution then proceeds to fix the value of a property which supports a mounted soldier at four pounds of gold, and in addition of those which support a naval *strateia* in the Aegean, Samiot and Cibyrhainiot fleets, where the service is particularly heavy.⁶⁰ For the

⁵⁷ Cf. LEMERLE, *Esquisse* I 70—73, II 43 f.; KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 71—88; AHRWEILER, *Administration* 5 f. For a more cautious assessment see A. P. KAZDAN, *Eshchyo raz ob agrarnykh otnosheniyakh v Vizantii* IV—X v. VV 16 (1959) 92—113; and KUČMA, *Komandniyi sostav*.

⁵⁸ Text at *JGR* I 222—226 (= DÖLGER, *Regesten*, no. 673).

⁵⁹ Θεσπίζομεν τοίνυν αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἡ συνήθεια ἀγράφως πρῶην ἐκύρωσε, μὴ ἐξεῖναι τοῖς στρατιώταις τὰ ἐξ ὧν αἱ στρατεῖαι ὑπηρετοῦνται κτήματα διαπωλεῖν κτλ.

⁶⁰ These fleets, in contrast to the imperial fleets, are αὐτόστολοι, which meant that they must provide also their own vessels, in addition to supplies and equipment (*JGR* I 223). See the description of Ibn Hawkal (La configuration de la terre [Kitab Surat al-Ard], trad. J. H. KRAMERS—E. WIET. Beyrouth-Paris 1964) 193—194.

sailors of the imperial fleet and the other fleets, the older rate is henceforth fixed by law, the value of the holdings supporting each *strateia* to be of not less than two pounds of gold. Those enrolled for either of these *strateiai* — οἱ ἐν ἑκατέραις στρατείαις κατειλεγμένοι — who have maintained their property whole can bequeath or donate it as they wish, dividing it equally or unequally among their heirs or others, excluding ἀξιωματικοί; it following, of course, that the *strateia* remains attached to the property. Each section of the property must support a corresponding proportion of the *strateia*.

The novel goes on to discuss the case of a στρατιώτης having more lands than are required. Three examples are envisaged — (a) where all the properties of the man are registered: he is henceforth not permitted to sell any of them, especially to any δυνάστης (of whom a comprehensive list is included);⁶¹ (b) where not all the properties are registered,⁶² in which case the owner can dispose of them as he wishes, providing that the minimum required for the *strateia* is in no way reduced; (c) where none of the land is registered — εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπογεγραμμένα εἰς τὰ τοῦ στρατιώτου ἀκίνητα — then the best, up to a value of four pounds of gold, is to be entered on the κῶδιξ, the rest is freely disposable. A fourth case, whose importance Lemerle rightly stresses, is where a man is subject to a partial *strateia*, in which case a proportional part of his property is registered.⁶³

There follows the assertion that not only those who serve in the “sacred legions of soldiers”, but also those who have fallen on hard times, are unable to fulfil their obligations and are therefore granted an exemption, are to be legally classified as *stratiōtai*, with the attendant privileges (which include protection from the sale of their land by the fisc).⁶⁴

Next come a series of provisions aimed at preventing a military holding from becoming unoccupied and uncultivated, and hence of

⁶¹ εἰ δὲ ἐν περιουσίᾳ πολλῶν ἀκινήτων ὁ στρατιώτης καθεστήκοι, ὥστε κατὰ πολὺ τὴν δικαίαν ὑπερβαίνειν ποσότητα, εἰ μὲν ἅπαντα ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς κώδιξιν ἀπογράφονται, μὴ δύνασθαι μήτε ταῦτα μήτε ἐκ τούτων τὸν στρατιώτην διαπωλεῖν, . . . μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ δύνασθαι τινα ἐκ τούτων ἀγοράζειν, καὶ μάλιστα περιβλεπτον ἢ ἀξιωματικὸν ἢ μητροπολίτην ἢ ἐπίσκοπον ἢ μοναστήριον ἢ ἕτερον τὸν οἰονδήποτε εὐαγῇ οἴκον ἢ δυνάστην μέχρι σχολαρίου κτλ.

⁶² Note that the unregistered land is τῇ στρατείᾳ ἀκαταδούλωτον.

⁶³ JGR I 224: εἰ δὲ μέρει στρατείας ὑπηρετεῖται τις, κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τοῦ μέρους αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν εὐπορίαν τυποῦσθαι.

⁶⁴ For a comment on this, see LEMERLE, Esquisse II 46 and note 2.

failing to provide both for its *strateia* and the state taxes to which it was subject.⁶⁵ Finally, the novel deals with the case of *stratiōtai* who have been forced into a greater or lesser degree of servitude, and whose lands have been absorbed into the estates of the *dynatoi*; with those who are illegally exempted from their *strateia* in return for handing over their lands to the protection of powerful military officers; and with those whose services have been usurped by the powerful.⁶⁶ Important for our purpose is to note that the action of re-directing the services of an active *stratiōtēs* is qualified as τῶν φοροσάτων τούτους ἀποστερήσαντες, while the military holdings are repeatedly qualified as τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἡ στρατεία ὑπηρετεῖται κτήματα or τὰ ἐξ ὧν αἱ στρατεῖαι ὑπηρετοῦνται. From the existence of partial *strateiai*, it is clear that the *stratiōtēs* or holder of the military land(s) need not himself be a soldier — as Lemerle notes, the first novel of Romanus I (April 922 ?) distinguishes the στρατιώτης from the στρατευόμενος, the latter being the actual soldier.⁶⁷ The military holding could be divided between heirs or as a gift; in which case the equipment and horse for *ton strateuomenon* must have been provided from contributions from each of the new holders of the land in proportion.

Further texts confirm that the holder of the land need not be the active soldier who serves with the army. A novel of Romanus II appears to refer to those who hold military land but do not serve, as well as to those who might be expected to serve actively.⁶⁸ In addition, we have also the undated novel of Nicephorus II which announces the increase of the minimum value of a military holding for cavalry soldiers from four pounds of gold to twelve pounds (a result of the establishment of new, heavily-armed cavalry regiments), and consequently the amount of the lands registered.⁶⁹ This novel makes it clear that the revenue of a holding was designed to maintain a soldier and his equipment. But it also raises a problem. Lemerle argued that the novel is not to be understood as compulsorily raising the value of military holdings; but rather of safeguard-

⁶⁵ Cf. LEMERLE, Esquisse II 47 and esp. notes 4—7.

⁶⁶ LEMERLE, Esquisse II 48—49 and notes; text: *JGR* I 225—226.

⁶⁷ *JGR* I 204 (DÖLGER, Regesten, no. 595); LEMERLE, Esquisse II 49.

⁶⁸ LEMERLE, Esquisse II 51—52; *JGR* I 244—245 (DÖLGER, Regesten, no. 690).

⁶⁹ *JGR* I 255—256 (DÖLGER, Regesten, no. 721). For the terms κλιβάνιον/ἐπιλωρίκιον (and κλιβανοφόρος/ἐπιλωρικοφόρος) see HALDON, *Military Technology* 34 f.

ing the lands of the *stratiōtai* by establishing a much higher margin within which the land was to be inalienable and which, in the event of its being illegally sold off, had to be restored without recompense.⁷⁰

This is a valid observation; but the practical effects of the novel must have been in addition to greatly increase the amount of land inscribed in the registers of the military *logothesion* which at the same time supported a *strateia*. The novel is quite clear: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ νῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ τῶν κλιβανοφόρων καὶ ἐπιλωρικοφόρων κίνησιν ἔλαβε, διακελευόμεθα, μὴ ἔχειν ἐπ' ἀδείας μηδὲνα ἀπλῶς στρατιώτην ἀλλαχοῦ διαπιπράσκειν ἀπὸ τοῦτου ἀκίνητον ὑπαρξιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπέκεινα ἔχει ἢ λιτρῶν ἀκίνητον εὐπρόσδοτον περιουσίαν.

In view of what is known of the relatively limited resources of the (apparently) greater part of the *stratiōtai* in the tenth century, it does not appear likely that many properties were large enough to merit such a value or to support the burden of a heavy cavalryman; and in this case it can only have been by amalgamating two or three holdings that the costs were covered, and that soldiers were thus provided for — by joint contribution.⁷¹ This question I will discuss below.

⁷⁰ Esquisse II 54.

⁷¹ As LEMERLE notes (Esquisse II 52—54) Nicephorus' novel does not triple the *strateia*, it merely triples the amount of inalienable land. But the measure was a response to the need to maintain more expensive heavy cavalry soldiers. We may therefore assume that a property with a value of twelve pounds of gold was sufficient; but that the older, less valuable property was not. Since this provision is clearly a reaction to a process already well under way, such troops can only have been maintained previously by joint contributions: that the *strateia* on properties of twelve pounds of gold was designed to support a heavy cavalry soldier is clear from the last (misplaced) paragraph (see note 79 below). For the economic position of the *stratiōtai*, see LEMERLE, Esquisse II 48 and note 1; note that while the *stratiōtai* may often have been relatively well-off in comparison with their non-military neighbours — οἱ πολιτικοὶ οἴκοι — their lands and wealth were frequently only just enough to cover the expenses pertaining to their *strateia*, and they fell easily into the position where they could no longer fulfil their obligations. For a general comment on the internal structure of the Byzantine rural community, see H. KÖPSTEIN, in: *Byzanz im 7. Jhdt.* 50—72; but note also the comments of H.-G. BECK, in: *BZ* 70 (1977) 482. For the position of the later *stratiōtai* cf. LEMERLE, Esquisse II 67—68; and ROSEMARY MORRIS, *The Powerful and the Poor in Tenth-Century Byzantium: Law and Reality.* *PP* 73 (Nov. 1976) 3—27, esp. 24—27. Their borderline position is revealed by the phrase used of the soldier Michael Argyromytēs (see note 73 below).

The examples from the Lives of Euthymius the Younger, of Nikon Metanoëite and of Luke the Stylite, demonstrate once again that the holder of the military land, inscribed in the register, was not always the active soldier.⁷² What is, however, interesting, is the difference between soldiers who could provide their own provisions — apparently a minority — and those who received *sitēresia* from the state.⁷³ In Luke's case in addition, it is clear from the context that while Luke's father held the property, Luke himself carried out the duties and was registered accordingly⁷⁴ (his family was quite wealthy: πατέρες δ' αὐτῷ καὶ γεννήτορες ὑπῆρχον εὐγενεῖς [. . .] ἐν συμμέτρῳ περιουσίᾳ πλούτου καὶ αὐταρκειᾶ χρεῖων τὸν βίον διανύοντες).

⁷² See V. Euthymii, V. Nikon Met., V. Lucae Styl. Other editions of the latter by A. VOGT, and F. VANDERSTUYF. Cf. ROSEMARY MORRIS, *art. cit.* 9, note 24.

⁷³ Michael Argyromytēs, healed at the tomb of Nikon Metanoëite, is τοῦ καταλόγου τῶν στρατευομένων, ἰδίοις ὀψωνίοις δ' ὁμῶς στρατευόμενος, κἀν ἐν τοῖς ἀπόροις τοῦτο τέτακται (V. Nikon Met. 211,25—26); while Luke the Stylite was ἐξυπηρετούμενος τῇ στρατιωτικῇ ἐπηρεῖᾳ . . ., οὐκ ὀψώνιον ἦτοι βασιλικὸν λαμβάνων σιτηρέσιον, ὥς ἔθος τοῖς στρατευομένοις δίδοσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρικοῦ οἴκου πᾶσαν τὴν χορηγίαν ἔχων κτλ. (V. Lucae Styl. 201,14—18). Unlike LEMERLE, Esquisse II 64, I do not consider that soldiers supplied with *sitēresia* from the state did not have *strateiai*, while those who served ἰδίοις ὀψωνίοις did. It seems rather that there were at least two classes of soldier recruited on the basis of their *strateiai*, the majority of whom supplied their own equipment and horses, but not their food, or at least only a limited proportion of it. This is suggested by the passage in the Life of Luke the Stylite, where Luke supplies freely τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ στρατοῦ πένησι καὶ ἀπορούσι τὰ πρὸς χορηγίαν. These *penētes* cannot be regular professional soldiers supplied by the state, since they would have no need of such handouts (and in any case would not be referred to as *penētes*, since their personal economic position was irrelevant to their service in the army). Rather, they are the less well-off soldiers, serving on the basis of a *strateia*, who can neither afford to properly supply themselves, but nor are they fully catered for by the state, which appears for the most part to have expected these soldiers to produce their own rations. Cf. Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik w'al-Mamālik, in: BGA VI 76—85, esp. 85: "Il n'y a pas de marché dans le camp romain. Chaque soldat est obligé d'amener de chez lui le biscuit, l'huile, le vin et le fromage dont il aura besoin." The text comes from reports of the middle of the ninth century or before. Cf. E. W. BROOKS, Arabic Lists of Byzantine Themes. JHS 21 (1901) 67—77, and MIQUEL, Géographie I xxi; II 394 f.

⁷⁴ Cf. LEMERLE, Esquisse II 64—65. His parents presented him for service: τὴν τῆς στρατείας ἐξυπηρετεῖν ἐπηρεῖαν προσέστησαντο (V. Lucae Styl. 200,8—9).

But the implications of this text are that the burden of military service had normally been attached to individuals, or perhaps families, rather than the land. Luke's parents present their son for service when he comes of age, rather than sending a servant or freedman, which they were plainly in a position to do. An exactly similar process is to be observed in the case of the soldier Leo and his son George (discussed in greater detail below), a story relating to the second decade of the tenth century in which a registered *stratiōtēs* grown too old for active service sends his son on campaign in his stead.⁷⁵

Here it should be stressed once again that while the *stratiōtikoi katalogoi* — muster rolls — always existed,⁷⁶ it was only during the first half of the tenth century that the military lands themselves began to be registered, and it was only at this time that a fixed value began to be fixed to them. This is quite clear from the novel of Constantine VII already examined, which remarks that it was ἐκ συνηθείας alone that the holdings were not to be sold off; and which makes it abundantly clear that "military holdings" may never actually have been registered: εἰ δ' οὐδόλως ἀπογεγραμμένα εἰσι τὰ τοῦ στρατιώτου ἀκίνητα.⁷⁷

On what basis therefore was a man *stratiōtēs*, since his lands are not even registered as such, unless the duty was originally attached to the person of the owner of the lands or his family? That there was in addition some uncertainty about the value such properties ought to attain is emphasised by the wording of a passage in De Caerimoniis, which refers to a property value of from four to five pounds of gold to support a cavalry soldier and of three pounds of gold to support a marine or sailor (the text states ὀφείλει ἔχειν [compare with the novel of Constantine, where the author states of the amount specified ὁ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀρκούντως ἔχειν δοκεῖ]).⁷⁸ In effect, the registration of military lands was still going on (it may only just have begun) in the first half of the tenth century; although it is apparent from the novel of Constantine VII that neither the lands themselves, nor the service which depended upon them were new — it had been necessary in the past, states the author, to ex-

⁷⁵ Cf. V. Lucae Styl. 200, 5sq., and LEMERLE, Esquisse II 63 f. and note 1. For Leo and George, see below, and note 100.

⁷⁶ See DÖLGER, Beiträge 96, note 1.

⁷⁷ See AHRWEILER, Administration 10; LEMERLE, Esquisse II 49.

⁷⁸ De Caer. 695, 14—18.

propriate without compensation those who had illegally obtained such properties.⁷⁹

Now the Life of Euthymius the Younger makes it clear that when the latter's father had died (having been *στρατεία καταλεγόμενος*), Euthymius himself, having no brothers but two sisters, had to be enrolled, even though he was only seven years old at the time.⁸⁰ That he was not required to serve militarily at all before he was eighteen should not surprise us, for the state can hardly have called him up before he was of fighting age; at which point he joined the monastic community, which suggests that he was able to acquit his services to the state in ways other than personally serving as a soldier.⁸¹ Had it been the land itself, however, which was regarded as "owing service", then surely Euthymius' mother could have enrolled herself and, if necessary, hired a man to serve as soldier until her son was himself old enough to fight. The same applies to the case reported in a letter attributed to Nikolaos Mystikos, in which a poor woman pleads that her son should receive *eleutheria* from his military obligations, since she has not the means to equip him. Here again, it is the son who is officially registered

⁷⁹ The last paragraph of the novel of Romanus Lecapenus of 922 which legally defines the eviction without compensation of purchasers of military lands is considered by LEMERLE to be a later addition. Constantine VII's novel refers to this practice as a custom, not a law. See LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 43 and 47, note 2; *JGR* I 204. I am inclined to agree with AHRWEILER's suggestion (*Administration* 16, note 5) that this paragraph actually belongs to the novel of Nicephorus II concerning the new cavalry (*JGR* I 256). The paragraph orders the return of all military lands alienated within the preceding thirty years, and adds: *εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκποίησιν τοσοῦτον τῷ στρατιῶτῃ περιλιμπάνεται, ὅσον τῷ στρατευομένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς νέας στρατείας σύστασιν ἐξαρκεῖ*. The wording here with reference to the *nea strateia* (i. e. the increased obligations based upon holdings worth twelve pounds of gold) strongly suggests that the paragraph is the final section of Nicephorus' novel, mistakenly appended at some point to the legislation of Romanus I. For the Ms. tradition of the novels, see N. G. SVORONOS, *Recherches sur la tradition juridique à Byzance: La Synopsis maior des Basiliques et ses appendices* (*Bibliothèque Byzantine, Études* 4). Paris 1964.

⁸⁰ The text reads: *καταγγχομένη* (his mother) *δ' οὖν ὁμῶς τῇ τῆς ἐκστρατείας ἐπιθέσει, ἀνάγκηπτον αὐτὸν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς ἐκδίδωσι κώδιξι*, where *ἐκστρατείας* should read *στρατείας*. Cf. V. Euthymii 172,19–20; LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 63. The text implies that the military officials had been informed of the death of Euthymius' father and required that the codex in which his name had been entered be brought up to date.

⁸¹ V. Euthymii 172,25; and see note 110 below.

(or so we must understand from the request for *eleutheria*), and whose mother is in effect asking that he be struck off the register.⁸²

It thus appears that the association of the service owed with the *land* that supported the incumbent, rather than with his *person*, was only formally and legally fixed during the tenth century and during the immediately preceding years. Originally, military service was owed by individuals, hereditarily, whose families had to provide their equipment and mounts from holdings which were automatically (by virtue of the military status obtained through their soldier-member) granted certain exemptions from state *leitourgiai*.⁸³ What was to begin with the hereditary obligation of

⁸² Cf. DARROUZÈS, *Épistoliers* II 50 (130—131). The letter is not in Nicholas I, Letters, since its attribution is not definite.

⁸³ Cf. LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 61; and see below note 94. The hereditary aspect of military service is strongly suggested by the retention in the so-called military codes of a clause penalising soldiers who disable their sons to prevent them being called up. Cf. *Leg. Mil.* 23 (cited note 52 above). As I have already suggested, hereditary military service was re-introduced or re-applied by Heraclius, although it was probably limited to the *comitatenses* and related formations. Palace units, which were better paid, served usually under much more comfortable conditions, and were limited in numbers, could safely rely upon volunteer recruitment. Note that the re-introduction of such a conscription among the field troops will also have brought *comitatenses* and *limitanei* administratively much nearer together, and must ultimately have made any real distinction between the two most difficult.

The retention in the *Basilica* (LVII 7.3) of the clause already referred to in the *CI* (XII 47.3; see notes 12—14 above) demonstrates the flexible ways in which such older regulations were applied, and also that they were not merely pointless repetitions of obsolete regulations. Originally utilised in the later sixth century to encourage recruitment and to boost the morale of voluntarily-enlisted men, the same ruling could be just as easily interpreted in the ninth century as requiring the eldest son of a *stratiôtês* to register himself (if he were physically able) upon his father's death. Its retention and application may be adduced as further evidence for the personal nature of the obligations upon those holding a *strateia*. That the regulation in question did not apply to the regular, full-time volunteer soldiers (such as the *tagmata*) at this time has been pointed out by F. DÖLGER, *BZ* 26 (1926) 109—110. The difference between the conditions of the sixth century — with its lack of recruits, and the consequent interest on the part of the state in making service for the mass of volunteer soldiers attractive — and those of the tenth century — existence of an established system of hereditary recruitment, and consequent absence of such an interest in the fate of volunteers' families — explains the apparent contradiction.

For the military codes, see F. DÖLGER in: *BZ* 36 (1936) 116; and E. DARKO, in: *BZ* 31 (1931) 226—227. The ASHBURNER recension is prob-

an individual serving in the imperial forces and registered in the military *kōdikes* or *katalogoi*, gradually became associated with an obligation upon the land or property held by such individuals and their families. It is surely an echo of this original relationship that we read of στρατιωτικοὶ οἴκοι as opposed to πολιτικοὶ οἴκοι;⁸⁴ and I suggest that the often contradictory legislation of the period reflects a confused situation, in which a tradition of military service owed personally by a military family (that is, a family whose head was subject to an obligation inherited from his father), supported to a certain extent by their own income (land/livestock in the majority of cases) was developing into a system in which the onus was transferred to the land, whose owners had to fulfil the obligations attached thereto. Leaving aside for the moment the origins of such a system, this argument would explain a number of anomalies.

First of all, it appears that it was still accepted in the middle of the tenth century that the military obligations were to be carried out personally by the holder of the "military lands" (as they had then become), or by the holder's eldest son. This is evident from the case of Luke the Stylite; and from a note in the *De Caerimoniis*, which states that it had been for a long time the rule that holders of *strateiai* should serve μονοπροσώπως, in person.⁸⁵ The text reads: χρῆ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τύπος παρηκολούθησεν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ὅτε γίνεται στρατία, μὴ δίδοσθαι τοῖς στρατευομένοις τήρωνας συνδότας ὡς περιουσίους, ἀλλ' εἶναι μονοπροσώπως στρατιώτας.

Lemerle considers that there may be some confusion in the terminology here, perhaps a result of the copyist misunderstanding his text.⁸⁶ But this need only be the case if we interpret the terms used in the passage rigidly according to the technical terminology

ably an eighth- or early ninth-century compilation; that edited by KORZENSKY is to be dated to the time of Leo VI or after. See now V. V. KUČMA, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΟΣ. K voprosu o svyazi trekh pamyatnikov vizantiiskogo prava. *VV* 32 (1971) 276—284.

⁸⁴ De Caer. 695,5. Cf. also Leo, Tact. IV 1, where the serving soldier's family is clearly seen as the basis of his service; and also Leo, Tact. XX 71; De Vel. Bell. 239,13—15. For a note on the latter, see LEMERLE, Esquisse II 61, note 4.

⁸⁵ De Caer. 695,18—21. The case of the soldier Leo referred to in note 100 below makes this quite clear.

⁸⁶ Esquisse II 57. Cf. the comments of A. KAŽDAN, *Eshchy raz (art. cit. in note 57 above) 95—96 and note 10.*

of the novels. If we translate ὁ στρατευόμενος as "he who is enrolled (i. e. in the military registers)", στρατιώτης simply as "soldier" and τήρων συνδότης as "contributory recruit", that is to say, the soldier-recruit who fulfils for the *strateuomenos* — as defined here — the active duties which the *strateia* comprises, then the meaning of the text is clear. It was originally the custom not to permit those registered for a military *strateia* to send representatives in their place, but rather that they should fulfil their obligations personally. The text goes on to specify that if the *stratiōtēs* is not able to support the burden of service, then he is to be given *syndotai*, or contributors, to enable him to carry out his duties. I stress that these *syndotai*, however, are not qualified as *tērones*, which suggests that they aided the enlisted men financially *only*.

If there is a confusion here, then it represents the state of affairs — it was quite acceptable that a *stratiōtēs* should also be *strateuomenos*. In the *De Caerimoniis* we have perhaps an echo of the second *κάκωσις* of Nicephorus I as recorded by Theophanes, whereby he προσέταξε στρατεύεσθαι πτωχούς καὶ ἐξοπλίζεσθαι παρὰ τῶν ὁμοχῶρων, παρέχοντες καὶ ἀνὰ ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἡμίους νομισμάτων τῷ δημοσίῳ, καὶ ἀλληλεγγύως τὰ δημόσια. While Nicephorus' measure *may* have been a conscription of previously unrecruited men, it seems much more probable that this was a measure designed to counter the reduction in military manpower through the impoverishment of the soldiers in the *katalogoi*⁸⁷ — of whom I think the

⁸⁷ Theophanes 486,23—26 and Zonaras III 306,7—10. As LEMERLE notes, what was new, and what was objected to, was the payment of the 18½ *nomismata* to the fisc for the soldiers' supplies or pay and equipment, *in addition* to the sharing of the taxes to which the soldier was subject. Normally, the soldier provided his own gear; but when impoverished, he was now to receive it from *syndotai*. But the communal payment of the public taxes of the soldiers was also a novelty, since Theophanes clearly brackets the two together: προσέταξε στρατεύεσθαι πτωχούς καὶ ἐξοπλίζεσθαι παρὰ τῶν ὁμοχῶρων, παρέχοντες καὶ ἀνὰ ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἡμίους νομισμάτων τῷ δημοσίῳ, καὶ ἀλληλεγγύως τὰ δημόσια κτλ. The principle of communal solidarity before the fisc was certainly not new, of course; but the extension of that principle to soldiers and their properties in financial difficulties was, a point already noted by DÖLGER (*BZ* 36 [1936] 158). In this sense, the measures outlined at *De Caer.* 695,18sq. may first have been instituted under Nicephorus I; for clearly in the eighth century a soldier such as Mousoulis had no such aid. *In their effects*, the measures described in the *De Caerimoniis* and those of Nicephorus are the same. Further, I do not believe that στρατεύεσθαι is to be translated as "enrolled", a term which implies that these *ptōchoi* had never been in the

soldier Mousoulaios in the well-known passage from the Vita Philareti is an example, as well as the soldier in the Vita Eustratii.⁸⁸

Secondly, it suggests why it was that military lands — *stratiōtika ktēmata* — are not referred to in the Fiscal Treatise, or earlier texts before the novels. The reason is surely because there was as yet no such officially-protected form of holding. Military service owed by individuals (who had land or other income able to support this burden) clearly *did* exist; but the service was attached to the man, not to his property. The paragraph already referred to (see note 87 above) in the *Tactica* of Leo VI was compiled before the Fiscal Treatise. It quite explicitly describes military service based on some form of private income, but attached directly to the individual or his family. The Fiscal Treatise, on the other hand,

army before; but rather as "called up" (again). Because of their poverty, they had not normally been called out for service (or had been called up but were of little use owing to their lack of equipment) even though they were on the military lists. Nicephorus' measure was intended to correct this. The point is supported by the fact that the theme officials clearly had a certain amount of freedom in the selection of those to be called up — *stratēgoi* in 912 accepted (ἐδέξαντο [as a commission]) the calling-up of a certain number of men, a phrase which suggests that not every possible conscript available was always called up. Cf. De Caer. 657,1sq. Cf. also Leo, Tact. IV 1, where it is stated to be ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνήθειαν that the *stratēgos* himself enrolls suitable officers and soldiers; and that the latter are to be, among other things, εὐπόρους, with families that can adequately support their service in the army. A similar sentiment is repeated at Tact. epilōg. 57. Thus the *ptōchoi* involved were, in my view, already listed ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς κἀδίδιν. Possibly the regulation is to be connected with the transfer of many theme soldiers and their families to Thrace, a process which entailed the disposal of their original lands and which may have considerably impoverished very many of them. See note 144 below.

It is difficult to believe that Nicephorus enrolled all the impoverished landholders in the empire, an act which would surely have inflated the army beyond manageable proportions, and brought thousands of totally untrained men into the ranks — although AHRWEILER, *Administration* 19—20, is of this opinion, and would compare this measure with those of Nicephorus II reported by Ibn Hawkal (see below).

⁸⁸ V. Philareti 125,34sq.; V. Eustratii 377,3—6. Eustratios gives his horse to a soldier whose own has died, and who cannot afford a new one. The event is placed during the reign of Leo V — evidence of the inefficacy of Nicephorus' measures? — or is this merely a *topos* which the writer borrowed, perhaps from the Life of Philaretos? Clearly, official regulations for aiding military families — such as they appear in the De Caerimoniis — were not always applied in practice, as the letters of Nikolaos Mystikos (note 82 above) and Michael Psellos (note 100 below) make clear.

dealt with land- and tax-assessment, not military service, and we should thus not be surprised if "military lands" are not mentioned.⁸⁹ They were merely one form of tenure not subject to state *leitourgiai* (with which the treatise does not concern itself) and therefore merited no special treatment. Indeed, since "military lands" as later defined were subject to the regular δημόσια, they were in the eyes of the Fiscal Treatise not exceptionable.⁹⁰

The same applies to the so-called Farmer's Law of the later seventh or eighth century, which deals with the land of a community of free peasants (or so it would appear), their obligations to one another and, marginally, to the state. But one important difference between the latter and the Fiscal Treatise of the early tenth century is a change in the procedure for dealing with abandoned or uncultivated land. In the Farmers' Law remains a trace of the old principle of *adiectio sterilitum* or ἐπιβολή (τῶν ἀπόρων), by which communal responsibility before the fisc meant also the payment by members of a fiscal community of the taxes due from a deserted holding, and eventually the re-distribution of such holdings among members of the community. By the time the Fiscal Treatise was compiled, this principle had been abandoned, replaced by a more direct intervention from the state: abandoned or uncultivated holdings were temporarily freed from their fiscal obligations until the occupier had brought the land back into cultivation, at which point

⁸⁹ For a bibliography of the Fiscal Treatise, see LEMERLE, Esquisse II 258, note 1. The edition consulted here is that of DÖLGER, Beiträge 113—123. On the treatise in general, see LEMERLE's comments, Esquisse II 258—265.

⁹⁰ The "military lands" of the tenth century clearly had to pay the normal state taxes. Cf. Leo, Tact. IV 1: οὐ γὰρ βουλόμεθα τὸν ἡμέτερον συστρατιῶτην (. . .) πλὴν μόνον τοῦ δημοσίου τέλους ἐτέρᾳ ὑποκεῖσθαι οἰαδῆποτε δουλεῖν. See also XX 71: ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς τοῦ λαοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ) τελεῖν τοὺς τε δημοσίους φόρους καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα αὐτοῖς ἀερικὰ καὶ μὴδὲν πλέον καταβαρεῖσθαι. They were freed from ἀγγραφείας ἀπάσης . . . καὶ ἀδικίας and it is further stated that ἐὰν δὲ ἡ καστροκτισία γένηται ἡ καραβοποιία ἡ γεφύρας ἀνάγκησις ἢ ὁδοῦ κατὰστασις ἢ ἀνάγκη τις ἐτέρα τῶν δημοσίων διουκῆσεων, καὶ οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ τὸν κατὰ τὸν τόπον δημόσιον διὰ μισθοῦ ταῦτα ἐργάζεσθαι, τότε μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου λόγου (. . .) ἅπαντες δουλευέωσαν.

These references have been noted before, of course, but in the present context it seems worth stressing them. See also De Vel. Bell. 239—240 and Psellos' letter referred to in note 100 below. In effect, there is little to distinguish the "military lands" as such from any property owned by a soldier's immediate family, which was similarly automatically exempted. See note 94 below.

public taxes were once more extracted. Alternatively, if after thirty years the original occupier or his heirs had not brought the land back into cultivation, the state had the right to detach it from its previous fiscal community and bestow it upon a new owner.⁹¹ The change in question probably took place during the ninth century, for a similar development occurred at this time in regard to soldiers' property and tax liabilities, and it is likely that it was connected with the reforms described above: the measures of Nicephorus I suggest strongly that the older system was still operated in the early ninth century, for there the members of the fiscal community are made responsible for the enrolled man's public taxes; whereas the example already cited from the *De Caerimoniis* with which Nicephorus' measures are otherwise comparable, implies a contribution towards the cost of equipment, not a responsibility for the payment of taxes. Such a conclusion is corroborated by what is known of the methods employed by the state in the tenth century for dealing with the holdings of soldiers no longer able to support their *strateia*.⁹²

⁹¹ Cf. LEMERLE, *Esquisse* I 60—61, 263, where the procedures are examined in detail and where the difference between the two systems and their wider significance (263 f.) are noted. On the vexed question of the nature of the Byzantine *allēlengyon* cf. G. OSTROGORSKY, *Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter. Byz* 6 (1931) 234 f.; IDEM, *Die ländliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X. Jhrt. VSW* 20 (1927) 29 f., 49 f. DÖLGER opposes OSTROGORSKY's views, cf. *BZ* 34 (1934) 371 f., *BZ* 36 (1936) 158; and *Beiträge* 130 f. Cf. also K. OSIPOVA, *Allilengij v Vizantii v X veka. VV* 17 (1960) 28 f. For a summary of the literature, see LEMERLE, *Esquisse* I 37, note 3. Most recently, see D. ANGELOV, *Zur Frage des Agrargesetzes und der Herausbildung der Feudalverhältnisse in Byzanz*, in: *Studien zum 7. Jhdt.* 3—9; S. MASLEV, *Die soziale Struktur der byzantinischen Landgemeinde nach dem Nomos Georgikos, loc. cit.* 10—22; and HELGA KÖPSTEIN, *Zu einigen Aspekten der Agrarverhältnisse im 7. Jhdt. (nach den juristischen Quellen), loc. cit.* 23—24; EADEM, in: *Byzanz im 7. Jhdt.* 40 f.

⁹² The connection between the passage of *De Caer.* 695,18—25, and Nicephorus' measure (*Theophanes* 486,23—26) already pointed to lies in the principle of maintaining the ability of those registered for military service to fulfil their obligations, whatever the fiscal base may have been. The passage in the *De Caerimoniis*, however, goes on to describe a similar process to that followed in the *Fiscal Treatise*, whereby holdings not able to carry the burden of their occupier's obligations are exempted — ἀπορρέοντα. Note DÖLGER's comment, *Beiträge* 129. For the procedure dealing with soldiers' properties outlined in the novels, see AHRWEILER, *Administration* 14—16, and LEMERLE's remarks, *Esquisse* II 57.

It is thus only from this time on (middle of the ninth century?)⁹³ that the state began to intervene in such matters, and it is only from the time when a stable basis for military recruitment becomes threatened that we should expect to find legislation protecting it, and the codification of an official terminology to describe what had previously operated customarily and without central interference.⁹⁴ That point appears to have been reached after the first decades of the tenth century, the result of internal social contradictions exacerbated by natural disasters. But this background does not concern us here.

Thirdly, there are the apparent contradictions within and between the texts. But this confusion is precisely the result of the first two factors together. On the one hand, the customary association of military service with an individual and his family (one of whom actually serves under arms); on the other, the need for the state to intervene to protect holdings which supported such families — previously an action which had not been required — and therefore to codify and specify the exact nature of these “military lands”. In the process of legislating for the land, it was inevitable that the service previously attached to the individual should be seen more and more as attached to his holdings; a result also of the fact that, under unfavourable conditions, the individuals or families concerned appear often to have abandoned their properties (presumably to move to an area where their obligations were not registered). The state was left with the land, however, and the attachment of the relevant obligations to the latter would naturally facilitate the maintenance of recruitment. Immovable land is a good deal easier to administer than people. Such a change seems already to lie be-

⁹³ The passage in the *Life of the emperor Basil* by Constantine VII (Theophanes cont. 346,5—348,9) which deals with a possible redistribution of clasmatic or abandoned land according to a process known from the *Fiscal Treatise* and other documents of the tenth century (cf. LEMERLE, *Esquisse* I 256—257) suggests that the older system had already been abandoned by the 860s.

⁹⁴ It should not be surprising that “military lands” do not appear in the *Basilica*. What of course does appear, in the *Ecloga* and in later legislation, is the Justinianic and pre-justinianic material dealing with soldiers themselves and their special position with regard to the laws of inheritance. Cf. *Ecloga* XVI 1; 3; Bas. A LVII 2.1 (= *Digesta* 49, 17.1); LVII (= CI XII 36.2); Bas. B VII 1.19/5; and the exemptions for them and their families from all but the basic taxes: cf. Bas. A LIV 4.3 etc.; Leg. Mil. (KORZENSKY) I 2.

hind the difference in terminology applied to soldiers and their holdings in the ninth and early tenth century as against that of the novels of Constantine VII. In the latter, military service is related quite explicitly to the land — τὰ ἐξ ὧν αἱ στρατεῖαι ὑπηρετοῦνται κτήματα — whereas the reference from the Vita Euthymii connects the service clearly to the family. The passage in the Book of Ceremonies also sees the obligation falling upon the individual rather than the land.⁹⁵

The clauses in the relevant novels of Constantine VII and his successors to Nicephorus II reflect the process of change. While it is clear that the land, whether it remains intact or is subdivided, must always carry its proportion of the military obligation, it is equally apparent that the principle of hereditary service within one family — the original occupiers — persisted. Whenever possible, the direct heirs of the previous occupiers were to receive the land, whether by bequest or after the desertion of the holding; although the principle of obligations fixed to the land was already strong enough to allow the bequeathing of the land to an outsider.⁹⁶

Hence also the difference in the tenth-century texts between *stratiōtēs* — the holder of the “military land” — and *strateuomenos* —

⁹⁵ Cf. *JGR* I 222—223. For the De Caer. reference, see note 92 above. Note that the compulsory transfer of thematic soldiers to Thrace under Nicephorus I involved many of them selling their lands, which they had inherited from parents or relatives. Here is no hint of military service attached to such properties, however. Cf. Theophanes 486,10—22, and note 144 below.

⁹⁶ Cf. *JGR* I 223: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀκινήτῳ κτήσει εἶεν οἱ ἐν ἐκατέρας (sc. cavalry and navy) στρατείαις κατεिलεγμένοι, καὶ σώζοιεν ταύτην συντηροῦντες ἀνεκποίητον, καὶ παραπέμποιεν εἰς τοὺς φυσικοὺς κληρονόμους καθ’ ὃν ἂν βούλοιντο νόμιμον τρόπον, μετὰ τοῦ οἰκείου μέντοιγε βάρους, εἴτε κατιόντες εἶεν πρὸς οὓς παραπέμπονται εἴτε ἀνιόντες εἴτε ἐκ πλαγίου, εἴτε ἐξ ἀδιαθέτου ἰσοκληρία τισὶν ἀρμόσει, εἴτε ἀπὸ διαθήκης ἐξ ἀνίσων μερῶν εἰκότως κληθεῖεν, γνήσιοι ἢ φυσικοὶ ἢ ἐξωτικοὶ παγανοὶ κληρονόμοι (τοὺς ἀξιώματικοὺς γὰρ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποκλειόμεν πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας διαδοχάς), καὶ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τοῦ κέρδους τῆς κληρονομίας ἐπεσθαι ὀριζόμεθα καὶ τὸ βάρος τῆς συντελείας. Cf. also 224: εἰ δὲ μέρει στρατείας ὑπηρετεῖται τις, κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τοῦ μέρους αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν εὐπορίαν τυποῦσθαι.

Compare § 8’ of the second novel of Romanus II (*JGR* I 244 = DÖLGER, Regesten no. 690), whereby a *stratiōtēs* may abandon his holding and enter the service of another, provided he bequeathes his whole property to relatives or non-relatives who can carry out the duties attached. Once again, this example makes it quite clear that the burden of military service had by now become definitely associated with the land from which the *stratiōtēs* drew his income.

the actively serving soldier. It has been found difficult to decide whether the latter was always a different person from the former or not, for the evidence is sometimes confusing and presupposes no general rule.⁹⁷ But in view of the above considerations, it is possible to be a little more precise. First, I do not think it justified to conclude that if there had once been an identity of *stratiōtēs* and *strateuomenos*, it no longer existed in the tenth century. The passage already examined from De Caerimoniis seems to me quite explicit, and relates actual military service to the holder of the *strateia*.⁹⁸ Certainly, this was changing in the tenth century, but there is no reason for doubting that there was an original identity of the two. Why else should the *strateia* only be held by a man, as is apparent from the case of Euthymius, whose mother, upon the death of her husband, previous holder of the *strateia*, was obliged to register her son as the new *stratiōtēs*? The objection voiced by Lemerle, that Euthymius could not be *strateuomenos* as well, since he was too young, is not relevant if it is recalled that the choice of those called up devolved upon the *stratēgos* and his staff, who selected from among those available (i. e. those registered in the military *kōdikes*) the soldiers required.⁹⁹ The remark of Leo VI is here relevant — ἐκλέξῃ δὲ στρατιώτας ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ ὑπὸ σε θέματος, μῆτε παῖδας μῆτε γέροντας.

Even in the eleventh century this identity of *stratiōtēs* and *strateuomenos* remains, as a letter from Psellos indicates. The letter is directed to a certain Maleses, κριτῆς τῶν Κατωτικῶν, and concerns a poor *stratiōtēs* who, being subject to a *strateia*, has been called up

⁹⁷ See, for example, LEMERLE's comments, Esquisse II 68.

⁹⁸ De Caer. 695,18—21. Note that poor soldiers were posted to the *apelatai*, which is surely evidence that they were expected to serve personally in the normal course of events.

⁹⁹ And compare the similar case in a letter of Nikolaos Mystikos, note 82 above. The point is emphasised by the fact that normally a widow, assuming she did not re-marry, acted as full and legal guardian of any children — male and female — and was responsible for the administration of the children's estate and legacy until they came of age. Had it not been the rule that only a male representative of a "military family" could be registered (with the underlying assumption that this involved active military duties), then there would have been no reason for the mother, as legal guardian and representative, not to register *herself*. Cf. KASER, RPR II 110—111, 277, 523 f. Soldiers were not called up before they were eighteen. See Vita retractata 37, note 3.

by an unnamed official. He is apparently unable to join his unit until he has acquitted his public taxes, which are in arrears, and Psellos requests that the latter be written off, so that the soldier ἐλευθέρῳ ποδὶ πεῖσον ἀπιέναι εἰς τὸ ταξιίδιον. It is quite clear that here was a *stratiōtēs* subject to a regular *strateia* who had been called up (κατεγράφη καὶ εἰς ἀλλαγὴν κτλ.) for active service.

A further text which deserves more attention comes from an eleventh-century collection of the miracles of St. George. It relates apparently to the Bulgarian campaign of 917 under Leo Phocas, which ended in disaster at Acheloos. A soldier of middling wealth (ἐν αὐταρκεῖα πλούτου διαβιούς), subject to a *strateia* (ἦν δὲ ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς καταλόγοις τεταγμένος ὁ ἀνὴρ, δς τὴν τῆς στρατείας ὑπηρεσίαν ἀπαραιτήτως ὑπηρετῶν διετέλει), is called up for active service, but due to old age is unable to go off on campaign. He sends his son George in his place: ὁ προειρημένος στρατιώτης Λέων εἰς γῆρας ἐληλακώς, οὐκ ἡδύνατο τὴν τῆς στρατείας ὑπηρεσίαν καὶ ὁδοιπορίαν τελέσαι· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄκων καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μονογενῆ υἱὸν Γεώργιον (. . .) ἀντ' ἐκείνου εἰς τὴν τῆς στρατείας ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκπέμψαι ἐβουλεύσατο κτλ. Again, there can be no doubt that the *stratiōtēs*, registered in the military codices, had to fulfil his duties personally.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Leo's remark: Tact. IV 1. — Leo goes on to note that the soldiers selected should be εὐποροὶ so that they are ἐν τῷ ἐξεδίτῳ ἡγουν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ τοῦ φοσσάτου εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν στρατείαν ἀσχολουμένους.

The term *strateia* is perhaps here meant in the widest sense, but if it does refer to the institution of military obligations in question, here is surely confirmation that the *stratiōtēs* and *strateuomenos* could be the same person. But see LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 60, note 4. Note in addition Leo, Tact., epil. 57, where the theme officials are also responsible καὶ πάντων τούτων ποιεῖσθαι διαίρεσιν, . . . τίνες καὶ ὅσοι νέοι ἢ γέροντές εἰσιν ἢ ἀνάπηροι τὰ μέλη ἢ διὰ νόσου ἀδύνατοι κτλ.

The whole of this passage Περὶ λογιστικῆς, which has remained unexploited, is of considerable importance, and illustrates very well the free hand given to thematic officials in selecting soldiers. See also the final remark at note 87 above. That this selection might often take on an arbitrary and unjust character is illustrated by a letter of Nikolaos Mystikos, who writes to an official (of the military *logothesion*?) on behalf of a boy who has been called up for active service (this seems to be the meaning behind the phrases πρὸς στρατείαν ἄγεσθαι and πρὸς τὴν στρατιωτικὴν λειτουργίαν ἀγόμενον, although this could possibly be a request for *syndotai* — since the youth of the individual prevents him from adequately farming his property and providing the cash *strateia* demanded by the state. The first explanation seems to me to be the more likely. See Nicholas I, Letters, no. 169).

We may perhaps introduce at this point the case of Mousoulios, the impoverished soldier to whom Philaretos gave his horse. Agreed, there is no evidence here of a military holding in the tenth-century sense. But clearly, Mousoulios was registered as a soldier; clearly, he had to provide his own horse and equipment; and clearly, he was called up by the local commander when he was required for service. From what, then, did he make his living? The answer seems inescapable that he drew his livelihood from an income or property of some description, which supported also the cost of his military duties. Had he been a full-time soldier, he would not have been called up in the manner described. Had he been merely the representative of a military household, appointed by them to carry out the active service (which certainly seems to have occurred in the tenth century), he need have had no fear before his officer, for the family, or group of families in the case of *syndotai*, that provided him with his equipment would have been at fault. His only way to escape the difficulties of the situation in which he found himself was to flee, to a region where his obligations would not be known.¹⁰¹ While the case is not strong, it seems very likely that Mousoulios was a *stratiōtēs* owing military service, which he was supposed to support in part at least out of his own private income (it need not necessarily have been derived from land, of course). He was both *stratiōtēs* and (in later terms) *strateuomenos*.

The man healed at the tomb of Nikon Metanoieite belongs to the same category of soldiers, and like Luke the Stylite, represents

For Psellos' letter, see Scripta Minora II 154—155 KURTZ—DREXL, no. 132. The letter demonstrates likewise the free hand left to provincial officers in terms of the soldiers they called up; and in addition the use of the words *καταγράφω/καταγράφουμαι* to mean not simply *enrol*, but rather *enrol/call up for a particular campaign*. Compare the comment on *στρατεύεσθαι* at note 87 above.

For the text recounting the story of the soldier Leo and his son (the former not to be confused — as the editor unfortunately does — with Leo Phocas, the domestic of the *scholai*, and later commander of the expedition in which Leo's son George was captured) see Miracula S. Georgii 19,6sq. and 21,6—13. The miracle was written down during the eleventh century, and can therefore be regarded as uncontaminated by anachronistic detail. See J. B. AUFHAUSER, Das Drachenwunder des Heiligen Georg. Leipzig 1911, 4f., 28.

¹⁰¹ V. Philareti 125,34sq. Note that Mousoulios is unable to buy another horse. He is clearly personally responsible for his obligations, and not the representative of another family.

those "military families" who supported a soldier and provided his equipment. As noted above, it is significant that while it was becoming quite usual for the occupier of a "military holding" not to serve personally (see below), nor seemingly for a member of his family, Luke's parents still presented him for enrolment, a point which illustrates the persistently hereditary nature of these obligations.¹⁰²

But this principle of hereditary service was progressively weakened during the tenth century, as the holdings themselves came to be regarded as the legal basis of the obligations to serve in the army. Hence it was possible for palace officers and court officials to have tenure of military lands and still be able to carry out their full-time duties in whichever *officium* they served, either by nominating another — whether outside their family or not is not clear, although the appointment of an outsider seems more likely — to fulfill the duties attached to that holding; or by paying a lump sum in lieu of the personal service, as Lemerle has pointed out.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Cf. note 73 above; and LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 68: "Il me paraît également certain que la «maison stratotique» a la faculté de désigner le combattant qu'elle sert, et qu'il peut être membre de cette famille." As late as the reign of Nicephorus II the hereditary nature of the military obligation was still conserved, although in a much weakened form, cf. *JGR* I 248 (DÖLGER, *Regesten*, no. 720): if a *stratiōtēs* commits murder, he is subject to the normal processes of the law; but his lands, which would normally be awarded wholly or in part to the victim's relatives as compensation, are to be kept intact, and if there are no relatives willing to undertake the *strateia* attached to the land, then another, unrelated person is to be found, who is willing to undertake this obligation: ἀλλὰ καὶ μή τις ὑπολειφθεῖη κληρονόμος τὴν στρατείαν ὑπελθεῖν βουλόμενος, ἕτερος τοὺς τόπους ἀναλαμβάνων ὑπηρετεῖτω αὐτῇ. That it should have been necessary to legislate for the land in this way at all suggests that the state is once again asserting a relatively recently-developed principle — that the *strateia* belongs to the land, not the owner.

I cannot accept AHRWEILER's assumption, *Administration* 14—15, that personal service was resorted to as a way out of difficulties for those subject to a *strateia*. Luke the Stylite's parents were clearly well-off. Personal service had been the norm, the appointment of a representative or commutation, the exception, a point which the miracle of St. George referred to in note 100 above makes abundantly clear. When the father was too old, his son carried out the service for him.

¹⁰³ Cf. LEMERLE, *Esquisse* II 57—58; De Caer. 697,18—698,22. The passage in question lists (a) those serving in certain *officia* — those in the *hetaireia*, for example — who are exempted from their *strateia*, should they be subject to one, when there is a general levy or call-up — *τηρωνάτων*. It is also provided that as long as such officers shall live, their houses (i. e. their

In this connection, the existence of lands subdivided by will or by distribution among heirs also points to the probability that soldiers supported and equipped from the revenues of a subdivided holding, each portion of which bore only a part of the obligation, did not belong to the family or families owning the land, but were either hired and equipped by the landholders when the *adnoumion* was announced; or equipped by the local military establishment, who extracted the equivalent of the *strateia* as a cash commutation.¹⁰⁴

It is also probable that in order to maintain the new corps of heavy cavalry established on a large scale by Nicephorus II, the principle of joint contribution was extended, as well as the amount of land registered in the military *logothesion* which was subject to the *strateia*.¹⁰⁵ A text of Ibn Hawkal confirms that in the time of

families) should remain free from any *strateia* to which they may previously have been subject; but that when they die, the *strateia* is to be re-established: *ὀφείλει ὀρθοῦσθαι ἡ στρατεία εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν τύπον τοῦ στρατιωτικοῦ λογοθесίου*; (b) those who are not to be exempted from their *strateia*. It was a general rule that holders of imperial dignities or offices were exempted from certain *strateiai*; and it was this that lay, in part at least, behind the prohibition on bequeathing lands to *ἀξιωματικοί*, cf. *JGR* I 223. Clearly, if *axiōmatikoi* were exempted from *strateia*, it was in the interests of the state to ensure that they did not obtain "military lands", and through the application of exemptions, reduce the strength of the forces thus recruited.

¹⁰⁴ Or perhaps the equipment and cash were provided, and handed over to soldiers sent out from the military headquarters of the district. An important passage in the *De Vel. Bell.* 239,13sq. notes the difference between the active soldiers and *οἱ ὑπηρετούμενοι αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται*. But it also distinguishes between the households of the active soldiers and those of the supporting *stratiōtai*: *τὸ τελείαν ἔχειν ἐλευθερίαν τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ὑπηρετουμένων αὐτοῖς στρατιωτῶν*. It follows from this that (a) the active soldiers do not, in the case envisaged, belong to the families of the *stratiōtai* subject to the *strateia*; and (b) the fiscal privileges accorded *stratiōtikoῖς οἰκοῖς* which supported a *strateia* were no greater than those accorded the families of soldiers recruited from other sources, which were, by virtue of their military member, *stratiōtikoῖς οἰκοῖς*, at least for the period of this service.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. note 69 above. Zonaras III 506,3sq. notes that all those previously subject to a *strateia* were placed under an increased obligation, marines/sailors being transferred to the infantry, infantry to the cavalry, cavalry to the heavy cavalry. Such a transfer can only have been efficiently carried out, as AHRWEILER, *Administration* 19, notes, if the actual service involved was commuted, the money being used to raise and equip the necessary troops. See more recently P. LEMERLE, *Byzance au tournant de son destin*, in:

Nicephorus II the wealthier land-holders had to provide a cavalry trooper, his equipment and an esquire; while the less wealthy paid approximately 10 dinars each (presumably to enable the *stratēgos* to raise and equip more soldiers). But this appears in fact to be an exceptional measure adopted for a limited time only, rather than a form of commutation of the *strateia*. The wealthier landholders referred to by Ibn Hawkal are to be equated with those not normally subject to a *strateia*, but who can be required, under exceptional circumstances, to provide a soldier and his equipment; a procedure also noted by Leo VI and by no means new. It is possible that those who paid 10 dinars each were actually *stratiōtai* paying a form of commutation; but again, it seems more likely that Ibn Hawkal refers here to an exceptional case, precedents for which already existed, of course, by which a general imposition on the population was levied to equip expeditionary forces.¹⁰⁶ The well-known case of commutation in the *De Administrando Imperio* perhaps foreshadows this procedure, whereby instead of furnishing equipment and men, the *stratos* of the Peloponnese opted to pay a cash sum, five *nomismata* each, or five *nomismata* between two for the poorer.¹⁰⁷

IDEM, *Cinq études sur le XI^e siècle byzantin*. Paris 1977, 266—267. A similar procedure must also have been followed when an impoverished military household could no longer carry out its obligations, as is clear from *De Caer.* 695, 21sq. In such cases, the cash raised may either have been delivered to the bureau of the *stratēgos* and used to equip other soldiers; or one of the family involved, equipped by his contributing neighbours, may have served personally (this is suggested by the wording of the passage [πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν (τῶν συνδότην) ἔχειν τὸ ἱκανὸν καὶ δουλεύειν τὴν ἰδίαν στρατείαν]). Possibly when groups of such military families in the same fiscal community contributed together, the member who actually carried out the military service was chosen in rote, which may be the meaning behind the term *σύναιχμοι* at *JGR* I 225. Soldiers from the same community seem to have served actively together, cf. Leo, *Tact.* XX 160.

¹⁰⁶ Text of the passage at Ibn Hawkal (cited note 60 above) 194. Note also the subsequent passage (which M. CANARD, *Byzance et les Arabes* II/2. Brussels 1950, 417, thinks may be from a different source, or at least describe a procedure that was normal, in contrast to that followed by Nicephorus on land) relating to maritime campaigns, for which there seems to have been a general hearth-tax on households in the naval provinces, the cash from which was used to pay the marines and set the fleet in order.

¹⁰⁷ DAI 51, 52. For LEMERLE's remarks, and the possibility of estimating the strength of the thematic army from the Peloponnese in the time of Romanus I, see *Esquisse* II 54 and 55, note 2. The fact that the text at *De Caer.* 695, 18—21 remarks that it was the old custom that the *stratiōtēs* served

A marked difference thus did develop between the *stratiōtēs* and the *strateuomenos* in the tenth century, a difference that was officially accepted and promoted as the need to protect the basis of the provincial recruiting system — the lands from which the registered families gained their livelihood — produced a legal codification of the obligations attached to such lands, and thus concealed the original nature of military service, a personal obligation upon individuals. But I stress that this distinction (which even in the later tenth century had not yet produced a complete commutation of service)¹⁰⁸ only became pronounced during the tenth century: the sources are not in fact contradictory if it is accepted that both personal service of the registered *stratiōtēs* or a member of his family as *strateuomenos* on the one hand, and the equipping and provisioning of an outsider on the other hand, were common practice in the second half of the tenth century.¹⁰⁹

personally makes it clear that this was no longer always the case. The development of a commutation of the *strateia* is supported by the report of Zonaras III 505,16—506,10, who remarks that the *epoptai*, *strateutai* and *prōtonotarioi* made repeated exactions on the whole populace, and these measures appear to have stimulated a generalisation of the fiscalisation of the *strateia* throughout the empire. This led eventually to the disappearance of the difference between military lands freed from certain *leitourgiai* and other lands. Cf. AHRWEILER, Administration 23, and Zonaras III 506,9—10: ἐφκει γὰρ τὸ πᾶν τῇ στρατιώτιδι μεταχειρίσει ἐπιγραφόμενος (sc. Nicephorus). For the provisions of Leo VI, see Tact. XX 205: ὅταν ἀπορῆς ἐξοπλίσεως τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τοῖς εὐπόροις μὲν, μὴ στρατευομένοις δέ, κέλευε, ἐὰν μὴ βούλωνται στρατεῦεσθαι, παρέχειν ἕκαστον ἵππον ἀντὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀνδρα· καὶ οὕτως οἱ τε πένητες ἀνδρεῖοι ὀπλισθήσονται, οἱ τε πλούσιοι καὶ ἀνάνδροι δουλεύουσιν κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν στρατευομένων. Note also Tact. XVIII 129: καὶ εἴ τι ἐνδὲον τοῖς στρατεύμασιν, ἢ ἵπποι ἢ ἀναλώματα ἢ πανοπλῖαι, καὶ ταῦτα χορηγεῖν διὰ κοινω- νίας καὶ συγκροτήσεως.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. e. g. P. LEMERLE, Recherches sur le régime agraire à Byzance: La terre militaire à l'époque des Comnènes. CCM 2 (1959) 279; and AHRWEILER, Administration 21 f. Cf. also the evidence of Psellos' letter, note 100 above.

¹⁰⁹ The question of how to resolve the apparent clash between phrases which imply the active participation of the *stratiōtai* in question in military duties, such as: στρατιώτας . . . καθοσιωμένους ταῖς ἱεραῖς λεγεῶσι τῶν στρατιωτῶν (JGR I 224); ὅσοι δὲ στρατιώτας ἱκανοὺς . . . τῶν φοσσάτων ἀποστερήσαντες (ibid. 226); or the reference to the restitution of military lands to the σὺναιχμοὶ of the previous (impoverished) owner (ibid. 225); and those which document the existence of *stratiōtai* who are not *strateuomenoi*, cf. JGR I 204 (novel of Romanus, Constantine and Christopher; DÖLGER, Regesten, no. 595):

How soon the latter developed it is difficult to say. The example of Euthymius, while it may suggest that it occurred occasionally beforehand, is dubious. Euthymius was still registered ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς καταλόγοις at the age of eighteen, when he decided to become a monk; and although there is nothing to suggest that he deserted his duties, neither is it likely that his biographer would have mentioned it if he had.¹¹⁰

A word is perhaps in order regarding the *kōdikes* or *katalogoi* in which the soldiers or their holdings were registered. As pointed out already, the military *ktēmata* began to be registered only in the first part of the tenth century¹¹¹ — previously the names only were registered. The lists were kept by the military *logothesion* in the capital, although there were certainly copies kept in each provincial headquarters, since the *stratēgos* and his staff were responsible for raising the troops in wartime and for reviewing them at the yearly *adnoumia*.¹¹² Such lists were presumably revised as the military holdings were also incorporated, perhaps involving the addition of

Πρὸς τούτοις δὲ κελεύομεν, ὥστε πάντα τὰ στρατιωτικὰ κτήματα . . . ἀναγγύρως εἰς τὴν τῆς ἰδίας στρατείας ἐνοχὴν καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν πάλιν ἐπανακάμψαι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκποίησην τοσοῦτον τῷ στρατιώτῃ περιλιμπάνεται, ὅσον τῷ στρατευομένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς νέας στρατείας σύστασιν ἐξαρκεῖ. (The paragraph seems to be a later addition, see note 79 above) is, I think, clarified by this formulation. For other texts which specify the *stratiōtēs* as landowner rather than as active soldier, cf. *JGR* I 244 (novel of Romanus; Dölger, Regesten, no. 690) and LEMERLE's commentary, *Esquisse* II 51 — note that the *stratiōtai* are twice regarded as landowners (in this case abandoning their land), but in the same paragraph are also assumed to take part in campaigns; and compare with Anon. *VARI* 48, where the author advises the *stratēgos* to keep his soldiers properly equipped and to ensure that they do not sell off their military equipment to buy farm animals or agricultural materials.

¹¹⁰ V. Euthymii 172,25, 173,29sq. Once Euthymius had left home, of course, it might be difficult for the military officials to trace him — assuming that he was called up at all. Absences were presumably noted at the *adnoumion* and followed up (or not, as the case may be) from there. LAURENT, *Vita retractata* 37, considers that Euthymius simply deserted, which, in my view, is what the text implies.

¹¹¹ A point remarked, but not sufficiently emphasised, by KARAYAN-NOPOULOS, *Entstehung* 87; AHRWEILER, *Administration* 15 and note 5; LILIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 314, note 61.

¹¹² Cf. De Caer. 657,1sq.; Leo, *Tact.* IV 1. Compare also the Mousoulaios passage in the *Vita Philareti* — the *chiliarchos* and his staff were presumably equipped with a muster-list to check the turn out of the soldiers. For the lists in the military *logothesion*, cf. De Caer. 698,13–15 for example.

an extra column so that the lands could be registered — ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς καταλόγοις ἀπογράφονται.¹¹³

To summarise the gist of the argument: the situation in the tenth century is one of wide-ranging changes, and of legislation to prevent some of these changes, which were regarded as detrimental to the efficiency of the armies (and hence to the authority of the central government) from going further. Briefly, the ability of individual soldiers to fulfill the hereditary obligations for which they were enrolled, was founded upon their lands (and originally also other forms of income). But these had been neither registered nor protected, although it had become customary that they should not be alienated, since thus the means to support the *strateia* might be lost. The service owed was personal, but need not be carried out by the official holder of the title — he might be too old or too young, for example. Instead, a member of the same family could (when the provincial government insisted upon the provision of a soldier) be appointed to carry out the necessary duties. This much is clearly confirmed by the story of Leo and George already referred to. In cases where the families became impoverished and unable to fulfill their duties, the reform of Nicephorus I appointed a certain number of contributors, with whose aid the family should continue to carry out its obligations. It was in any case the final responsibility of the general and his staff to select, from all those registered, soldiers for particular campaigns. By the time of the tenth-century legislation, the lands which were the basis of this military service needed protection, and henceforth the hitherto personal obligations of the family which owned the land, while not being lost sight of, became increasingly replaced by an impersonal obligation fixed to the lands themselves. It became possible, and indeed necessary, as a result of the parcellisation of holdings, to appoint a soldier not belonging to the family or families which held the land, to carry out the duties involved; while at the same time it became normal practice for the

¹¹³ There must have been a variety of *stratiōtikoî kōdikes*. Full-time regular soldiers will have been registered on one set of codices; while those owing service through a hereditary *strateia* must have been kept separately. The addition in the tenth century of the military lands will have been to this second group. See DÖLGER, Beiträge 96, note 1. For the probable appearance of these *kōdikes*, see N. SVORONOS, Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI—XII^e siècles: Le cadastre de Thèbes. *BCH* 83 (1959) 1—166, see 21—22.

state to commute the services for cash in order to raise and pay full-time troops. The eventual result, as a number of scholars have shown, was the complete fiscalisation of the *strateia* and its application as a tax levy on the whole population. The military lands as such disappeared.

The origins of this system will be examined below. What I have tried to show here is that because "military holdings" do not appear in the sources before the 830s, and in official legislation before the 930s, this is absolutely no argument for their non-existence.¹¹⁴ Their appearance in legal and other official literature of the tenth century is solely a response to a threat which forced the state to take action to preserve what was already a weakened institution. I do not believe that the *stratiōtika ktēmata* were a marginal or local phenomenon, for in this case the legislation of the tenth century would hardly have been necessary. On the contrary, I think they were the "hidden" basis for the recruitment of a considerable proportion of the Byzantine provincial armies, a basis which was revealed only when it was threatened.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Pace KARAYANNOPOULOS, Entstehung 83—87; LEMERLE, Esquisse II 66. Compare LILIE's sensible comment: Die byzantinische Reaktion 314, note 61.

¹¹⁵ For a discussion on the background of this legislation, see ROSEMARY MORRIS, *art. cit.* (note 71 above) 8 f. That the "part-time" soldiery probably outnumbered by far the "full-time" troops, i. e. those who served on a mercenary basis and adopted a military career voluntarily, is suggested by the figures for the expedition to Crete in 949 in the De Caer. 664,2sq., where a total of approximately 340 officers and soldiers, including the staff of the *stratēgos*, is listed for the Thrakesion *thema* and its various *tourmai*. The regulars seem in fact to be concealed by the general term *προελευσιμαῖοι*. Such troops were probably concentrated around the headquarters of the theme *stratēgos* and the regional *turmarchs*. The remaining soldiers of the theme were "theme soldiers" proper, that is to say, troops who were called out only for the duration of the campaigning season.

C. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE "MILITARY LANDS"

To trace the origins of this form of recruitment is a somewhat more difficult task. There is evidence in plenty for the activities of Byzantine armies throughout the seventh and eighth centuries. But little of it concerns the ways in which these armies were raised and organised. Nevertheless, some general suggestions about the ways in which the system described above grew up may be hazarded.

Professional, full-time forces were always maintained, both in the themes and in the capital. The corps of *excubitores* up to the middle of the seventh century or a little later, that of the *spatharii*, and the *noumera* and Walls regiments made up the guards units at Constantinople, supplemented from the middle of the eighth century by the new *tagmata* established by successive emperors. In the provinces, a corps of full-time, paid regulars was maintained in the largest garrison towns and at the headquarters of the *stratēgos*. The proportion of regulars to those released from service for part of the year was probably in favour of the latter. But this can only be answered when we have decided when and how the recruitment-system which came ultimately to be based upon "military holdings" developed.

The confused years during the second half of the seventh century present themselves as the period most likely to have given rise to a system of recruitment such as that described above. I have shown elsewhere that it was precisely at this time that the Byzantine forces began to be localised and to lose their former character of full-time field forces maintained in regular garrisons.¹¹⁶ It was also at this time that the *kaballarika themata* appeared, and as I have suggested, this reflects already the division of the military forces into two groups, those based more or less permanently in garrisons or at other strategic points, and those able to participate in mobile and often long-distance actions.

It is apparent that the field armies were widely scattered throughout the districts they occupied. So much is demonstrated

¹¹⁶ Cf. HALDON, Some Remarks 170 f., and also LILIE, Die byzantinische Reaktion 311 f.

by (a) the success with which Arab raiders were able to penetrate into Byzantine territory, meeting little or no opposition in the field — the troops were centred in defensible towns, or spread among smaller settlements as a protection for the local population, and (b) the fact that the imperial forces were forced to adopt a policy of avoidance, following a strategy of ambushes and shadow warfare.¹¹⁷ Such a policy was both stimulated by, and in its turn promoted, a localisation of forces.

But more concrete evidence exists. The text relating to the soldier Mousoulíos shows that by the 780s — and presumably for some considerable time beforehand — the military forces of the empire were scattered throughout their districts, and called together for campaign service or review only occasionally during the year. Mousoulíos himself clearly lived at home, since Philaretos encounters him on his way to the *adnoumion* — had he been based in a regular, centralised garrison, such a procedure would not have been necessary.¹¹⁸ An earlier text, however, comes from the *Ecloga*, possibly issued by Leo and Constantine not in the year 726, but in 741.¹¹⁹ The text in question — XVI 2 — has recently been the subject of an article by J. Mossay and P. Yannopoulos, and since its importance is not to be ignored, it will be worth looking at their arguments in some detail.¹²⁰

The text deals with the procedure to be followed when the parents of brothers die, and when one of the brothers is *strateuomenos*. Should the brothers have previously made no arrangement over the division of their common heritage and live together ten years from the time when the first brother entered the service of the state, all revenues from the salary (*δόγχα*) and from the produce of the common household are shared equally. If they live together

¹¹⁷ HALDON, *Some Remarks* 169, 171; LILLIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 92 f.

¹¹⁸ See AHRWEILER, *Administration* 8—9.

¹¹⁹ Cf. V. GRUMEL, *La date de l'Éclogue des Isauriens: L'année et le jour*. *REB* 21 (1963) 272—274. See however D. SIMON, *Zur Ehegesetzgebung der Isaurier*, in: *FM* I 40—43; and O. KRESTEN, in *FM* IV (forthcoming): *Datierungsprobleme „isaurischer“ Eherechtsnovellen*. I. Coll. I 26, notes 49—68. Thanks are due to Dr. KRESTEN for drawing my attention to this article. For the text, see *JGR* II 50—51. See also the comments of P. E. PIELER, in: HUNGER, *Profane Literatur* II 438, note 97.

¹²⁰ J. MOSSAY — P. YANNOPOULOS, *L'Article XVI, 2 de l'Éclogue des Isauriens et la situation des soldats*. *Byz* 46 (1976) 48—57.

for a further period, and decide to separate during the next three years, then the brother in state service has the right to take his horse, harness and military equipment before the rest of the property is subdivided. If they continue to live together after thirteen years, then the soldier also has the right to receive what he has saved from his salaries (*rogai*) and also what he receives as booty and donatives. The word used throughout for "enrol" or to describe the brother who is enrolled, is στρατευθῆναι, στρατευθῆναι, ὁ στρατιώτης which, as Mossay and Yannopoulos correctly point out, bears the general sense of serve the state, but in this context, clearly refers to a soldier—since horse, harness and *lorikion* are referred to.¹²¹ The term *roga* is explained as being of a general nature; although from the context in which the term is used I see no reason to doubt that it is used of the cash pay of the soldier in question, as opposed to *donativa* and booty.¹²² The authors of the article in question conclude that the paragraph "est rédigé de telle façon qu'il s'applique à n'importe quel genre de militaire".

But if we look at the assumptions made by the authors of our text, this is simply not the case. First, the soldier *owns* his horse, his weapons, and other equipment, and this is already a clear departure from earlier practice — all weapons and military equipment

¹²¹ *Art. cit.* 50—52. The word ἄρμα is clearly to be taken to mean armour (or similar military gear) and not chariot or cart (*pace* MOSSAY and YANNOPOULOS, *art. cit.* 54—55). The easy confusion between the breathings by later copyists both in this text and in others explains the confusion between ἄρμα and ἄρμα. We can hardly suppose that every theme soldier went off to war with a horse and cart, which is what this interpretation (and others: see GUILLOU, *Régionalisme* 152; LIPŠIC, *Ekloga* 62) implies. ἄρμα was a general term applied usually to a soldier's armour. Cf. DARROUZÈS, *Épistoliers* II 50, where the essential equipment is ἵππος, φαρέτρα (bow and case with quiver) and κράνος. For ἄρμα/ἄρματα as armour, see, for example, Leo, *Tact.* VI 15; 23; and especially Kekaumenos (LITAVRIN) 158,12—14 (WASSILIEWSKY and JERNSTEDT 21,2—4). The term is in our case to be related to *lorikion* in the next clause. Cf. Joannes Antiochenus, frg. 218F (Exc. de Insid. 150,13sq.): Καλλιοπᾶς ὁ Τριμολαίμης ὁ ἡνίοχος, φορῶν ἄρμα καὶ κασσίδα (from a passage relating to Heraclius' arrival at Constantinople in 610). The text of the *Ekloga* suggests that the soldier's defensive equipment might be rather limited — καὶ ἐὰν ὡς εἰκὸς ἐπεκτῆσατο λωρίκιον καὶ μόνον — not surprisingly, since the *lorikion* was a mail shirt which constituted a valuable and extremely expensive item. Cf. HALDON, *Military Technology* 18 f., 34 f.

¹²² Thematic soldiers also received *rogaî*, of course. Cf. for example AHRWEILER, *Administration* 7 f.

had belonged to the state and were in this respect not heritable. The same applied to cavalry mounts, which were bought by troopers through the army when they enlisted with a special cash allowance issued for the purpose, and which continued to belong to the state.¹²³ In the tenth century, the situation with regard to the provincial forces was clearly quite different, as the *De Caerimoniis*

¹²³ For state control and ownership of weapons, see Just., Nov. 85.1; Maurice, *Strategikon* I 2.11. Cf. JONES, *LRE* 670—671. See also *CI* XII 39.4 (for clothing/uniform allowances); Sebeos 37 (Maurice arms and equips Armenian recruits); and for the yearly allowance, see *Strategikon* I 2.1; I 2.11; I 2.16 (also I 6.10; I 8.6); Theophyl. Simocatta VII 1.1—2. M. HIGGINS, *A Note on the Emperor Maurice's Military Administration. AnBoll* 67 (1949) 444—446, suggests that mounts belonged in fact to the soldiers of Maurice's armies, chiefly on the grounds of their fear of losing them through lack of forage in 602, and the fact that horses were awarded for bravery in battle, in addition to items of arms and armour. It is argued that had horses and equipment been a "free issue", such a practice would have had little sense (*art. cit.* 445). But this is to be explained rather through the difficulty of obtaining new mounts at all, and especially of obtaining a second cash grant from the army to purchase remounts. The soldier was naturally held responsible by the army for his mount and equipment (cf. *Strategikon* I 6.10), but the army was responsible for ensuring that horses were available to be purchased (*Strategikon* I 2.16). The passage in Theophylact Simocatta referring to the proposed reform of the pay procedure under Maurice, by which the salary was to be divided into three, surely means, as Jones, *loc. cit.* remarks, that this was traditionally paid in cash, and that Maurice proposed to prevent its misuse (and ensure that the troops equipped themselves properly) by issuing clothing and arms direct. This does not, however, mean that the soldiers, who normally "bought" these items from or through the army, personally owned them — the legal prohibitions on the private possession of military equipment are quite clear in this respect. Had they been regarded as the soldiers' own property, the state would hardly have been prepared to remunerate troops for weapons damaged or lost in the course of duty (*Strategikon* I 6.10). It seems to me that exactly the same considerations applied to horses; and that while the soldier "owned" his mount (for which he had to pay out of his state grant and salary) while in service, this belongs ultimately to the state, which had in the first place paid for it. HIGGINS mentions finally the case of Gregory of Antioch in 589, who had given the soldiers money, food and clothing when they had been drafted into the field-army. As I have pointed out, this refers to ill-equipped *limitanei* rather than regular *comitatenses* (above note 18); but even if this were not the case, it does not invalidate the present argument: private persons had to step in before this to make good the tight-fisted attitude of the government. Cf. Proc., BG III 1.8 where Belisarius replaces weapons and horses out of his own pocket.

makes very clear; and the text from the *Ecloga* suggests that a change in this direction had occurred already by the 730s.¹²⁴

That the soldier in question owned his horse and equipment is thus of considerable significance — we have to do here with a quite different type of soldier from the regulars of the sixth and first part of the seventh century, and in this sense he is closely related to the soldier Mousoulíos already discussed, who *owned* his horse; and to the other provincial soldiers referred to who were *expected to provide their own horse and equipment*.¹²⁵ It seems clear from this evidence alone that the *Ecloga* soldier is not a regular soldier in the older sense. But there is additional support for this suggestion, for the text states that, in the case where the brothers have not already drawn up a legally binding arrangement as to the division of their heritage, then the *rogai* which the *strateuomenos* receives should be treated as the common property of the household for the first ten years. Now this is in direct conflict with the usual procedure, for a soldier, receiving the benefit of military *peculium*, was given exclusive control of any income or property he received which was defined as *peculium castrense* (στρατιωτικὸν πεκοῦλιον) whether he was legally still a minor or not. *Rogai* received in the course of his

¹²⁴ Cf. HALDON, *Military Technology* 42; De Caer. 657 ff. Only full-time, regular troops, such as the *tagmata*, received clothing, equipment and mounts from the state. See AHRWEILER, *Administration* 26.

¹²⁵ The possibility that the state still provided a cash grant with which provincial soldiers could purchase their mounts is excluded by the fact that the horse is deliberately provided for in the *Ecloga* text. Since possession of the horse could thus be disputed, it clearly cannot have belonged to the state. In the ninth century and later it was certainly the usual case that theme troops owned their own horse, for which they were responsible. Cf. V. Eustratii 377,3—6; and Theophanes cont. 92,18sq.; a story of Theophilus' time concerning a soldier whose chief asset was his horse; and note Kekau-menos (LITAVRIN) 158,11sq. (WASSILIEWSKY — JERNSTEDT 21,1sq.): τοὺς στρατιώτας σου ἀνάγκαζε πρὸ πάντων ἔχειν ἵππους καλοὺς κτλ. Cf. De Vel. Bell. 239,4—8 where the writer stresses the importance of regular pay to the theme troops, for this enables them to obtain good horses. The provision of a horse was clearly the responsibility of the individual soldier, although the authorities might help by ensuring that a good supply was available for sale to those who needed remounts. See Leo, *Tact.* VI 23; and note the important addition Leo makes to the original text of Maurice's *Strategikon* I 2.16. In the sixth century, horses were bought by the army and then sold to the soldiers. In the tenth century, the *stratēgos* merely ensures that sufficient horse-dealers and merchants are available from whom the soldiers can purchase remounts.

state service (however we are to define them here — as a cash salary or as other forms of remuneration) were certainly placed in this category. He was entitled to retain all such income and to dispose of it freely without any obligation to endow part of it on relatives or dependents, or to share it.¹²⁶ These stipulations in fact appear in summary immediately before our text, as *Ecloga XVI 1*. The question arises, why should it be necessary to modify the usual regulations in this way, and to stipulate that the enrolled brother should contribute his earnings to the common household?

The answer is surely that the older regulations had been to a certain degree overtaken by events, and a new situation had arisen, one in which some soldiers now depended directly upon their households or families, and were therefore obliged in return to share with the latter their service remuneration as long as they continued in this dependent position. Only when this dependency ceased does the mutual relationship terminate, which is clearly stated in our text. Here it is important to note that the soldier must retain his horse and military equipment, without which, of course, he could not carry out his duties. The position of our text and the probability that it deals with a real problem of inheritance which, under the new conditions envisaged, could no longer be regulated according to the older law, supports the argument. Naturally, the older regulations are retained, since they still applied to soldiers in regard to inheritance. But where soldiers are now partially dependent upon their families or households for their maintenance, new legal situations had to be taken into account. Here we see the legal embodiment of practical experience.

The fact that the text specifically stated that the soldier should retain his horse and military gear should be emphasised. If these were issued to him, or bought with cash issued to him by the state, this would be quite unnecessary, since the soldier automatically

¹²⁶ See note 94 above; also *Proch. Nom. XXII 5* (171): ἐὰν πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν παίδων πατὴρ τελευτήσῃ, συμβῇ δὲ ἓνα ἐξ αὐτῶν παγανικὸν ἔχειν πεκούλιον καὶ ιδιόκτητον, τὸ μὲν παγανικὸν κοινὸν ἔσται πάντων τῶν ποτε παίδων ὑπεξουσίῳ, τὸ δὲ ιδιόκτητον μόνου τοῦ κτησαμένου. Cf. also *XXII 6*: στρατιωτικὸν πεκούλιον counts as ιδιόκτητον; and A. DAIN, Sur le "peculium castrense". *REB* 19 (1961) 253—257. Note especially *Ecloga XVI 3*, where soldiers are quite explicitly exempted from the regulations applying to other servants of the state in regard to the claims of relatives on their property.

kept such equipment. This is yet another reflection of the fact that the horse and the equipment were provided in part at least by the household — which might thus have a legal claim to them — although used exclusively by one man. To prevent dispute over their possession, our text makes it quite clear that the soldier receives them in advance of any subdivision of the common heritage.¹²⁷

I do not think there is any doubt that the passage in question alludes to the existence of soldiers who were in part dependent upon their households. The soldiers envisaged do not represent the type familiar before the middle of the seventh century, equipped essentially by the state, and remaining to this extent independent of their families. We may conclude that by the 730s (and possibly some decades earlier, since the text represents a reaction to a developing state of affairs) a system of recruitment was already developing which rested upon the provision by the soldiers themselves of basic equipment, mounts and, possibly, rations. This in itself is a major and very important departure from the procedure followed hitherto. By the early eighth century, the characteristic marks of ninth- and tenth-century thematic service were already present.

To what extent was this soldier still a full-time regular, and to what extent does he represent the “part-time” soldier typified by Mousoulaios in the 780s and by Euthymios and Luke the Stylite at a later date? Two points should be borne in mind. First, the context of our passage is a reciprocity between the soldier and his family, which quite explicitly involved the former regarding his pay, under particular circumstances, as the common earnings of the family. During the limited time envisaged by the text, therefore, the household presumably supported him while on active service by providing also a proportion of his rations. He may thus have spent

¹²⁷ ἐπαίρειν τὸν στρατιώτην ἐξαίρετως τὸν ἵππον αὐτοῦ σὺν τῷ σελλοχαλίνῳ καὶ τῷ ἄρματι (sic) αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐὰν ὡς εἰκὸς ἐπεκτῆσατο λωρίκιον καὶ μόνον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα μερίζεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀδελφικῶς ἐξίσου καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης μοίρας.

Soldiers took their equipment with them when released from field duties. Cf. Leo, *Tact.* VI 1; and Anon. *VARI* 49,22sq. Note that Leo refers to the owning or possession of items of equipment, *Tact.* VI 3, which he interpolates into the text of Maurice (cf. *Strategikon* I 2.3). The Anon. *VARI* 48,8—49,20 points to the danger of the theme troops selling off their military gear in order to obtain farm implements. Other texts make it equally clear that the theme soldiers bought their own equipment out of their own resources. Cf. De Vel. Bell. 239,4—8; and Kekaumenos (*LITAVRIN*) 158 (WAS-SILEWSKY — JERNSTEDT 21).

at least part of the year at home.¹²⁸ Second, the military service involved here is clearly personal. There is no suggestion that the enrolled brother should have enough land to support the costs of his equipment and service — he can clearly leave his brother(s), with his share of the inheritance, when he will — the text is an attempt to legislate for the heritable property when no definite agreement exists. What the soldier must have, however, is his horse and gear. I am inclined to see in this text, therefore, the original situation of the theme soldiers. Equipped by their households and families, fulfilling a personal (hereditary) service in the army, they have freedom of movement still. It is up to them to ensure that their households can support that service. Our text says nothing of exemptions from state *leitourgiai* or other privileges, of course, since they do not concern the case envisaged. But this silence hardly affects the case outlined above.¹²⁹ The text provides in effect good evidence for the existence by the 730s of the provincial forces known from a slightly later epoch, represented by Mousoulíos and Euthymios, soldiers who drew their income from personal property, probably land, which supported and equipped them for their hereditary military duties; and whose families, by virtue of the owner's membership of the army, gained a series of privileges in respect of certain state charges and minor taxes. Such a system of "self-supporting" provincial troops, hereditarily bound to serve, probably began to develop

¹²⁸ The fact that strict regulations existed, enjoining that soldiers should not participate in agricultural or other non-military activities, does not imply that the soldiers were not "at home" for part of the year. The same regulations were repeated again and again from the sixth century onwards, although it is clear that provincial soldiers could and did involve themselves with the cultivation of their holdings, cf. AHRWEILER, *Administration* 8 f. The existence of such legislation hardly proves that soldiers did not engage in such activities, as YANNOPOULOS and MOSSAY would have it (*art. cit.* 57). The aim of the legislation was to prevent the total absorption of the soldiers in agricultural affairs. Cf. the comments of PATLAGEAN, *L'Impôt payé par les soldats* 306—307. Soldiers of the Ravenna exarchate both owned land and remained full-time soldiers, marching away on campaigns and remaining absent for considerable periods. See BROWN, *Italy* 113—114, 146. Cf. the pertinent remarks of LILIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 314, note 62.

¹²⁹ Soldiers' households were in any case normally exempted from *leitourgiai* and similar impositions of the state. See above, notes 94 and 104. For the suggestion that service among the provincial troops was still hereditary, see note 83 above. But I do not think, as DÖLGER did (*BZ* 26 [1926] 111), that there is evidence in this paragraph for a "military holding" as the term is applied to soldiers' properties in the tenth century.

from the 660s, as provincial commanders found it increasingly necessary to spread their forces over a wide area in order to combat the numerous small but damaging raids of the Arabs.¹³⁰

That the state or provincial government proceeded to settle soldiers on deserted lands, from which they were henceforth to draw their support, seems to me unlikely.¹³¹ Abandoned or deserted land needs a considerable amount of work before it becomes productive again, and such an operation would certainly have distracted the soldiers involved from their main task. More probably, regular soldiers began to be more or less permanently billeted on landowners in the region where they were garrisoned. The landlord must feed and maintain his guest according to the usual regulations,¹³² who, as in similar circumstances in Italy, Syria and Egypt will have rapidly become part of the community. Many may have bought or leased land — there is ample evidence from Egypt and especially from Italy and Syria of the sixth and seventh century for just such a development — holdings from which the soldier obtained a private income, and from which he could, if necessary, support himself. The state did not need to settle the soldiers, merely to garrison them and to require the host to maintain them in winter quarters. We need not search for “military holdings” since such did not exist. Rather, we must clarify a process by which regular soldiers were billeted more or less permanently (although this may never have been the original intention) throughout the region which they garrisoned, and by which they acquired their own properties and settled down. Neither need we seek to explain the granting of special privileges to such holdings, for as already pointed out, soldiers’ families received certain exemptions and benefits as a matter of course.¹³³ Indeed, once units came to be based permanently in an area, enlistment was certainly considered an advantage, as the example of both *limitanei* and *comitatenses* in Egypt proves. The benefits which military status brought may well have acted as a stimulant to recruitment at this time.

¹³⁰ See my comments in *Some Remarks* 171—172, and LILIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 311 f.

¹³¹ As LILIE suggests: *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 312—313.

¹³² See the regulations at CI XII 40; 41, retained in Bas. A LVII 5.2—12.

¹³³ See the references at notes 94 and 104 above; and note also PATELAGEAN, *L’Impôt payé par les soldats* 308.

A remarkably similar development occurred in Italy, while Syria provides a number of striking parallels.¹³⁴ The troops continued to be supplied by the state when on long campaigns; when not on campaign, they supported themselves, even when still regarded as being on active duty. Regular parades were held to ensure their readiness for action — once again as in Egypt and Italy — after which the soldiers were dismissed and returned to their posts, or to their billets and homes.¹³⁵

The troops may in addition have been paid only irregularly (which was certainly the case during the reigns of Justinian and his successors, and probably remained the case throughout the seventh century), which must have promoted a reliance on purely local resources, until the troops' *rogai* were delivered. Possibly the mention by Constantine VII of a four-yearly payment reflects a later rationalisation of the irregular pay of the provincial soldiers.¹³⁶

Further, there is no reason to believe that the troops based in their local communities were not in theory on active service all year round, excluding the usual three-month leave-period over the winter season. The localisation of the majority of the units making up each army would lead, as noted above, to an assimilation of those soldiers with the local population. But they were originally based in those localities for defensive purposes — to protect the local population against raiders, or to guard some strategically important point or other. They were called out from these localities for larger operations as required. The yearly *adnoumion* was in origin not

¹³⁴ Cf. DIEHL, L'Exarchat 295—296, 308—312, 315—318; and GUILLOU, Régionalisme 156—161. See now BROWN, Italy 136 f., where the nature and extent of the ownership and leasing of land by soldiers is clearly presented. Soldiers could be both landowners — on a large or a small scale — and full-time members of their garrisons. For Syria, see R. M. PRICE, The Role of Military Men in Syria and Egypt from Constantine to Theodosius II. Oxford D. Phil. thesis 1974, 171 f., and PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté 255 f., 313 f.

¹³⁵ See note 134; and for Egypt, JONES, LRE 662—663. Note for example the recommendations for regular parades in Anon. VARI 48, and the carrying-out of arms- and equipment-checks at the *adnoumion*; Leo, Tact. VI 15.

¹³⁶ Cf. De Caer. 493,20sq. Irregular pay seems always to have been a problem in the Byzantine forces, even in relatively peaceful times. Ibn Khurradādhbih notes that the soldiers often received four, five or six years' pay at once (84 — cited note 73 above). For the same problem in the sixth century, see Proc., BG III 11.13—14; and cf. J. KULAKOVSKIJ, Istorija Vizantii II. Kiev 1912, 165, 303.

simply a check on the equipment of "farmer-militiamen", but on the contrary, a check on the state of regular units whose strategic isolation normally made such a procedure very difficult. It is important to notice that when Mousoulíos was called out to an *ad-noumion* in preparation for a campaign against the Arabs, the imperial officers in charge visited τὸ ἐκεῖσε στρατόπεδον that is to say, the army (or garrison) in that region. The idea of an active garrisoning force is here evident.

But the outcome of the localisation was, of course, that the full-time, regular army increasingly took on the form (and attitudes) of a part-time, militia force. This was probably not the intention of the state. The soldiers were still theoretically full-time regulars; they were theoretically supposed not to indulge in agricultural or trading activities.¹³⁷

Just how soon this process began is difficult to say. Perhaps as soon as the armies had been permanently stationed in fixed districts for a fairly lengthy period — in the later 660s and 670s, since the withdrawal into Asia Minor was already well under way by the early 640s. To what extent it was influenced by the deliberate settlement of Slavs in Anatolia during this period must remain un-

¹³⁷ Their continued mobility speaks for the retention of their original capacity as field troops, at least to a certain extent. Thematic units frequently went on long campaigns, often lasting several months and sometimes more than a year. Compare the campaign of 774, for example, when Constantine V left detachments from all the thematic forces along the Bulgarian frontier — that these were exclusively from the "regular core" of the provincial forces is to be doubted. Cf. Theophanes 446,23sq. Theophanes provides many other examples. Troops from the Armeniakon *thema* were often based in Thrace, especially during the later eighth and ninth century, cf. Miracula S. Thera-pontis 688; V. Steph. Iun. 1156. The peratic *themata* were still in Thrace in September 786/787: see Theophanes 462,5sq. They often campaigned during the harvest season, an unlikely achievement for an army of peasant farmers (see BROWN, Italy 118—120, on the mobility of the Ravenna troops). They certainly developed local sympathies, and were often easily inspired to rebel, see W. E. KÆGI, JR., Patterns of Political Activity of the Armies of the Byzantine Empire, in: On Military Intervention. Papers of the Armed Forces and Society Group, World Congress of Sociology, part II. Varna 1970, 1—35, esp. 13—15. But they appear to have retained the function of the field-forces from which they were directly descended. For the three-month leave-period, see Maurice, Strategikon I 6.3; I 7.3. In the 630s, leave of up to four months was granted to soldiers of the *comitatenses*. Cf. Acta M. Anastasii Persae 26. For the withdrawal into Anatolia, see the references to KÆGI's articles cited in note 40 above.

clear, although it is apparent that Justinian II at least intended to extract military service from his new settlers.¹³⁸ Possibly the latter were conscripted and then given land in a deliberate attempt to imitate the natural process which was occurring among the regular Roman armies. That the *limitanei* created a precedent for the deliberate settlement of soldiers along the frontier is highly unlikely. To begin with, the old *limes*, restored by Heraclius after 626,¹³⁹ had been completely overrun — the approximate line of demarcation between Roman and Arab territory in the later seventh century corresponded in no way with the earlier frontiers and the regions where the *limitanei* had been based.¹⁴⁰ That a system of *limitanei* was deliberately re-established in a new area in the 660s seems to me unlikely, the more so when the limited importance of such troops and their ineffectiveness as all but a local police force had been recognised.¹⁴¹ *Limitanei* undoubtedly subsisted in north Africa until the Arabs had overrun the exarchate of Carthage. But the origins of later military holdings in the East should not be sought here (as Karayannopoulos seeks to a certain extent to do), for the connection had long been broken when such holdings began to develop. The process was rather a "natural" one, in which troops permanently garrisoned in the areas they defended were absorbed by the local populace and acquired or rented small properties.¹⁴² Soldiers brought with them certain advantages, both in terms of status and in terms of their freedom from certain fiscal charges. To

¹³⁸ For the Slavs, see especially the remarks of LILIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion* 237—239; also KARAYANNOPOULOS, *Contribution* 495; *IDEM*, *Vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit* 57, note 24; and more recently H. DITTEN, *Slawen im byzantinischen Heer von Justinian I. bis Justinian II.*, in: *Studien zum 7. Jhdt.* 77—91, esp. 86.

¹³⁹ See HALDON, *Some Remarks*.

¹⁴⁰ See LILIE, *Die byzantinische Reaktion*, map at p. 337, and compare with JONES, *LRE*, map VI.

¹⁴¹ Cf. MASPÉRO, *Organisation* 23, 60; JONES, *LRE* 662—663. The exception is the *Legio* based at Beroea which was called out in the critical situation of 584 and fought alongside units of *comitatenses*. See above note 18.

¹⁴² For KARAYANNOPOULOS' arguments, see *Entstehung* 74 f. and 88; but note JONES, *LRE* 649 f. For the process in Italy, see note 135 above. A similar development occurred in Syria and Palestine, as the Nessana papyri demonstrate. Cf. PATLAGEAN, *Pauvreté* 255—256, 265, 313 f. See also the comment of DITTEN (*art. cit.* [note 138 above]) 85, who, however, sees the later "military lands" as simply a "re-activation" of the earlier *limitanaeae*. Against this, see the sensible remarks of PATLAGEAN, *Pauvreté* 307—308.

begin with, they constituted in many ways a distinct social group within their new communities, an asset which improved their opportunities of obtaining land or other property.

Unlike Italy, however, Anatolia presents no documentation for such a development, and logical though it might appear in the light of what is known of the social position of the *stratiōtai* at a later date, it must remain a hypothesis.

That many soldiers possessed landed property, or had also a secondary source of income which could support them, is thus very probable.¹⁴³ The continued application of a hereditary enlistment of soldiers' sons would strengthen such a tendency as soldiers' families became firmly settled. It is impossible to determine whether the military authorities began deliberately to shift the burden of providing for the soldier and his equipment onto his family or host, however. More probably, the development was a result of the failure of the central government to maintain regular payments to the troops, and of the inability of the military authorities to adequately supply such widely distributed units.¹⁴⁴ It had certainly begun before 741. Soldiers could thus be dependent upon their families or their private resources — if they became impoverished, there was no means of recovering their situation until the reforms of Nicephorus I partly took their position into account. The military authorities provided merely a (theoretically) regular cash payment, and supplies during campaigns.

Thus special legislation for the holdings or other sources of income which supported the soldiers is not forthcoming, because the duties were attached to the soldier, not his possessions. Only in the tenth century, when a large-scale process of alienation of soldiers' properties got under way, did the state take decisive steps to protect these holdings and effectively to transfer the obligations involved from the soldier and his family to his land. As the economic position of this group was progressively weakened, so their

¹⁴³ That all soldiers acquired land is, of course, unlikely, at least over such a relatively short period of time. Many may have had other occupations, however, as the process of assimilation in Egypt and Italy — albeit from an earlier period — suggests. See JONES, LRE 660—663, for examples.

¹⁴⁴ In this respect the remarks of TEALL, Grain Supply 112, are to be noted. The distribution of the troops over wide areas would certainly reduce the problems of supply for a part of the year at least, and in the conditions after 650 may well have been a significant factor in encouraging the spreading-out and localisation of units.

ability to personally carry out their duties was reduced, and the tendency increased of commuting the services due for cash, which could be used to raise mercenary soldiers, the demand for whom was of course far greater in the conditions promoted by the large-scale offensive operations and reconquests undertaken during the tenth century.

The origins of the *stratiōtika ktēmata* are thus to be sought in the permanent establishment of the field troops of the imperial armies during the 650s and after in the regions which they were to defend. They developed gradually as a response to local needs and circumstances and at least to some extent as the result of a pre-existing principle of hereditary military obligations. They have nothing to do with the lands held by *limitanei* — however similar the two developments may appear; nor with any deliberate administrative policy undertaken by the central government — although local administrative initiative is not to be excluded. Neither have they, to begin with, any *direct* connection with the establishment of the themes, areas under permanent military occupation, whose civil administrative functions were gradually usurped by military officials, the better to organise defence and to provide for their soldiers — although both processes were going on together.

* *

*

Recruitment in the Byzantine empire thus took on two basic forms — voluntary recruitment (which includes various forms of press-ganging, recruitment through the offer of bounties and other rewards, through the settlement of foreign mercenaries with their families on Byzantine soil, and the hiring of whole detachments of foreigners for limited periods),¹⁴⁵ and conscription, effected either

¹⁴⁵ It is not the purpose of this paper to examine exhaustively the material which demonstrates this facet of recruitment. A few of the more important references will suffice. For the recruitment of individuals, see that of Leo (later Leo III) at Theophanes 391,10sq.; Theophanes cont. 737,7—12; of Leo, Michael and Thomas in the early ninth century, Theophanes cont. 6,4—20. Such individuals clearly saw the army, especially service in the retinue of an important officer, as offering the possibility of a good career. For the recruitment of large groups within the empire through the offer of bounties and similar rewards, see Theophanes cont. 177,20sq. for the reign of Michael III, and the description in the De Caer. 657,20sq. for the first half of the tenth century; and for the recruitment of foreigners, cf. the well-known case of

through the hereditary obligations in soldiers' families (re-introduced during the reign of Heraclius), or through obligations attached to the land of families with such hereditary obligations. The latter was a development which grew directly out of the former during the later seventh century; but which only became legally defined as the economic position of these families became weakened.

The examination of these processes as they actually operated during the ninth and tenth centuries — for which there is a considerable body of evidence — must await a further study, however.¹⁴⁶ The present paper is merely an attempt to present a general picture of the developments which produced the seemingly complex and mutually exclusive recruitment patterns of the tenth century. The

Theophobos in Theophanes cont. 112,18sq. Smaller recruitments of volunteers took place at various times. Thus Artavasdos collected troops in 741 (Theophanes 417,26—8, Nicephorus 61,2—5); and Leo IV increased the number of theme troops probably by the addition of volunteers to the standing forces of each province, cf. Theophanes 449,16—17. The officers who supervised the *adnoumion* to which Mousoullos was summoned (V. Philareti 125,34sq.) were very probably part of this "standing" force, attached directly to the *stratēgos*, as were the staff-officers and soldiers referred to in the company of the various *stratēgoi* in the military lists of the De Caer. 664,2sq., for example. For a good example of such a "career officer" see the account of the *drouggarios* Nikephoros and his son Baanes in the later ninth century, in De S. Maria Iunior 692E—F, 694A, E, 703F.

¹⁴⁶ There were, for example, varying degrees of commutation of the *strateia* possible in the tenth century. In addition, it is clear that while a large proportion of the provincial troops may have been raised in the manner described, their individual wealth varied considerably. Some could supply equipment, mounts and provisions for themselves; others could afford only equipment and horses, but were provisioned during their active service by the state. Despite the common basis of recruitment, therefore, the *stratiōtai* of the ninth and tenth century should not be seen as a homogenous social group. Cf. the comments of E. PATLAGEAN, "Économie paysanne" et "féodalité byzantine". *Annales E.S.C.* 30 (1975) 1371—1396, see p. 1378.

There is also the question of the renewal of the supply of these hereditarily-bound troops — clearly time would tend to erode their numbers, making the recruitment of new soldiers bound by the same obligations necessary. This appears to have been accomplished in a variety of ways — by encouraging men to enlist by emphasising the fiscal privileges attached to military status; by offering bounties to those who would sign themselves up; and possibly by "press-ganging" those in a position to support the *strateia* but who could not resist official pressure from the local administration. The activities of the *stratēgos* who, according to Leo's *Tactica*, was to enlist those who could support the *strateia*, might reflect such a form of conscription. See Leo, *Tact.* IV 1.

anomalies and contradictions of the evidence can, I think, be resolved, if it is borne in mind that the evidence from legal sources, which is frequently treated as representing a fixed, official terminology, was itself in a state of flux and must be handled with some caution — I am thinking particularly of the varied uses of the terms *stratiōtēs* and *strateuomenos*.

Many aspects of the problems reviewed here are in need of further research and discussion. I have avoided going into the question of the development of social dependency through the alienation of land and the impoverishment of "military families", although this is clearly important in the discussion on the beginnings of feudal social relations in the Byzantine world.¹⁴⁷ Instead, I have attempted to clarify the administrative developments which took place, since these are central to any understanding of Byzantine society and the state during the period in question. It is hoped that the present study will at least provoke further debate.

¹⁴⁷ See most recently D. ANGELOV, *Zur Frage des Agrargesetzes*; and the articles of MASLEV and KÖPSTEIN cited in note 91 above. See also KUČMA, *Komandniyi sostav*; and the section of HELGA KÖPSTEIN, *Zu den Agrarverhältnissen*, and that of F. WINKELMANN, *Zum byzantinischen Staat* (Kaiser, Aristokratie, Heer), in: *Byzanz im 7. Jhdt.*

GENERAL INDEX

- Acheloos, battle, 917 57
adaeratio 24 f.
adiectio sterilium 52
adnoumion 60, 63, 67, 75 f., 79¹⁴⁵
 Aegean: see Fleets
 Africa 77
 Apsich (Hun officer) 22
 Anatolia (see also Asia Minor) 28 ff.,
 37, 76¹³⁷, 78
 Anatolikon 34, 39⁵⁵
 Antioch 28
 Arab attacks/raids 19, 67, 77
 Arimanni (see also Heriman/Heri-
 nam) 22⁸
arma (= armour/weapon) 68¹²¹, 72¹²⁷
 Armeniakon 33⁴⁰, 34, 39⁵⁵
 Armenians 22, 26 f.
 Artavasdos 79¹⁴⁵
aurum tironicum (see also *adaera-*
 tio) 20 f., 24
 Avars 27²⁴
axiomatikoi 42

 Baanes (*drouggarios*) 79¹⁴⁵
bandon 32
bandophoros 32
 Basil I (867—886) 54⁹³
 Belisarius 23¹¹, 26
 Beroea 25¹⁸, 77¹⁴¹
biarcus 21, 23
 Bithynia 30

 Caesarea 30 f.
capitularii 21
 Cappadocia 29 f.
 Cappadocians 22
 Carthage (exarchate) 77
 Chalcedon 30
 Chazars 36⁴⁸
chiliarchos 63
 Cibyrrhaiot: see Fleets
 Cilicia 29
 Codex Iustinianus 20 f., 26

 Codex Theodosianus 26
coloni 27
 Comentiolus (brother of Phocas) 29
comes excubitorum 29²⁹
comitatenses 24¹⁵, 28²⁵, 48⁸³, 74, 76¹³⁷,
 77¹⁶¹
 conscription 20 ff.
 Constantine V (741—775) 67
 Constantine VII (913—959) 17, 18,
 40 f., 46, 54⁹³, 55, 75
 Constantine Lardys 33, 34⁴³

dekarchēs 32
donativa 68
 Drocton (Lombard officer) 22
drouggarios 32, 79¹⁴⁵
drouggos 32
dynastēs 42⁶¹
dymatoi 17, 43

 Ecloga 67, 70
 Egypt 39⁵⁵, 74 f., 78¹⁴³
eleutheria 47 f., 60¹⁰⁴
 Elias (*stratēlatēs*) 32³⁷
epibolē (τῶν ἀπόρων) 52
 Eustratios 51⁸⁸
 Euthymios (the younger) 45, 47, 63,
 72 f.
excubitores 66

 Farmers' Law 52 f.
 Fiscal treatise 51 ff.
 Fleets: Aegean, Cibyrrhaiot, Sa-
 mian 20

 George (Saint) 57, 59¹⁰²
 George (soldier) 46, 57, 64
 Gildo 26
 Goths 22¹⁰
 Gregory (Patriarch of Antioch) 25¹⁸,
 69¹²³

- Heraclius (610—641) 17, 19, 26, 28 ff., 33 ff., 68¹²¹, 77
 Heriman/Herinam 22⁸
 Heruls 22¹⁰
hetaireia 59¹⁰³

 Illyrians 22, 23¹¹, 26, 27²⁴
 Illyricum 23
 Isauria 27²⁴
 Isaurians 22, 23¹¹
 Italy 23¹¹, 26, 74 f., 78

 Justinian I (527—565) 17, 26 f.
 Justinian II (685—695, 705—711) 39⁵⁵, 77

kaballarika themata 66
katalogoi: see *stratiōtikoī*, *kōdikes*
kentarchēs 32
kōdix/-ikes 33, 42, 47⁸⁰, 49, 50⁸⁷, 63, 64¹¹³
komēs 32
ktēmata: see *stratiōtika*

Legio Quarta Parthica 25¹⁸, 77¹⁴¹
leitourgiai 48⁸³, 52, 73
 Leo III (717—741) 67, 79¹⁴⁵
 Leo IV (775—780) 79¹⁴⁵
 Leo V (813—820) 51⁸⁸, 79¹⁴⁵
 Leo VI (886—912) 51
 Leo, Phocas 57
 Leo (soldier) 46, 49⁸⁵, 57¹⁰⁰, 64
limitanei 21, 24¹⁵, 25, 28, 48⁸³, 74, 77, 79
logothetēs 33 f., 38
logothesion (military) 34⁴³, 44, 60, 63
 Lombards 22⁸
lorikion 68, 72¹²⁷
 Luke (stylite) 45 f., 49, 58 f., 72

 Maleses, κριτής τῶν Κατωτικῶν 56
magister (militum per Armeniam) 33⁴⁰, 35
magister (militum per Orientem) 28, 33⁴⁰, 35
magister (utriusque militiae) 27

 Maurice (582—602) 22⁹, 23, 26, 28, 31, 69¹²³
 Michael II (820—829) 79¹⁴⁵
 Michael III (842—867) 79¹⁴⁵
 Michael Argyromytēs (soldier) 44⁷¹, 45⁷³
 military holdings (see also *stratiōtika ktēmata*) 42 f., 46, 59, 63, 66, 74
 military lands (see also *stratiōtika ktēmata*) 41, 42 f., 46, 52, 54 f., 77¹⁴²
 military *peculium*: see *peculium (castrense)*
militia 36
monoprosōpōs (adv.) 49 f.
 Mousoulios (soldier) 50⁸⁷, 51, 58, 63¹¹², 67, 70, 72 f., 79¹⁴⁵
munera 21

 Narses (*magister militum per Orientem*) 28
 Nicephorus I (802—811) 38⁵⁴, 50, 53, 55⁹⁵, 64, 78
 Nicephorus II (963—969) 37⁵¹, 43, 47⁷⁹, 55, 59¹⁰², 60 f.
 Nicetas 29
 Nikephoros (*drouggarios*) 79¹⁴⁵
 Nikolaos Mystikos (Patriarch of Constantinople) 47, 51⁸⁸, 56⁹⁹, 57¹⁰⁰
 Nikon Metanoieite 45, 48
noumera 66

officium/-a 59
officiales 20
opsōnia 45⁷³

 Palestine 27²⁴, 39⁵⁵
 Pannonians 23¹¹
peculium (castrense) 70, 71¹²⁶
 Peloponnese 61
 Persians 19, 22, 34, 35⁴⁵, 38, 39⁵⁵
 Perso-Armenians 22¹⁰
 Peter (brother of Maurice) 24, 27²⁴
 Philaretos 67
 Philippicus 29²⁹
 Phocas (602—610) 28 f.
 Phocas, Leo: see Leo, Phocas

- Phocas, Nicephorus II: see Nicephorus II
- politikos oikos* 44⁷¹, 49
- Priscus 29
- protostasia* 20 ff.
- prototypia* 20
- Psellos, Michael 51⁸⁸, 52⁹⁰, 56 f.
- Pylai (Bithynia) 30
- Radagaisus 26
- Ravenna (exarchate) 73¹²⁸
- roga* 67 f., 70, 75
- Romanus I (920—944) 43, 61¹⁰⁷
- Romanus II (959—963) 55⁹⁶
- saltuenses* 27
- Samos: see Fleets
- scholai* 57¹⁰⁰
- scribones* 21⁵, 27
- Sicily 27
- sitēresia* 45
- Slavs 27²⁴, 76 f.
- spatharii* 66
- strateia* 18, 35 f., 41 ff., 48⁸³, 50, 53, 56 f., 59¹⁰², 60 ff., 64 f., 80¹⁴⁶
- stratiōtēs/-ai* 17, 18, 41 ff., 48⁸³, 55 ff., 59¹⁰², 60¹⁰⁴, 61 f., 68, 78, 80¹⁴⁶, 81
- stratiōtika ktēmata* (see also military lands/holdings) 51, 63, 65, 79
- stratiōtikoi katalogoi* (see also *kōdikes*) 46, 50, 63 f.
- stratiōtikos oikos* 49, 60¹⁰⁴
- strateuomenos* 49 f., 55 ff., 62, 67, 70, 81
- stratopedon* 76
- syndotai* 49 f., 57¹⁰⁰, 58, 60¹⁰⁵
- Syria 39⁵⁵, 74 f.
- tagmata* 48⁸³, 66
- temonarii* 21⁵
- tēron/tiro* 49 f.
- tēronaton* 59¹⁰³
- thema/-ta* (see also *kaballarika*) 30 ff., 38 ff., 66, 76¹³⁷
- Theodotos (*drouggarios*) 32⁸⁷
- Theophobos (Persian mercenary) 79¹⁴⁵
- Thomas (the Slav) 79¹⁴⁵
- Thrace 22⁹, 23, 50⁸⁷, 55⁹⁵
- Thracians 23¹¹
- Thrakesion (*thema*) 65¹¹⁵
- Tiberius II (578—582) 22⁸, 25, 31
- tourma* 32
- tourmarchēs* 32, 39⁹⁵
- tribounos* 32
- Vandals 22¹⁰
- Vitalius 23¹¹
- Walls, regiment of 66



The author is Lecturer in Byzantine Studies at the Centre for Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham; and is also a member of the Birmingham–Dumbarton Oaks Byzantine Demography research project. He has worked extensively abroad, at the University of Athens 1972–73 while writing his doctoral thesis; and at the Institut für Byzantinistik und neugriechische Philologie in Munich, 1976–79. His publications include articles on military technology, Iconoclasm and the social and administrative history of the Byzantine armies. His chief interests lie in the field of social, economic and administrative history, upon which his research is currently concentrated.